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The Zoning Board of Adjustment:
A Case Study in Misrule
By JESSE DuKEmmiR, J1.
and
CLYDE L. STAPLETON"
The question must be asked seriously whether zoning, as
it is currently being practiced, is endangering our democratic
institutions. A second question stemming from the first is:
"Is zoning increasingly becoming the rule of man rather than
the rule of law?" I would be inclined to answer both questions
affirmatively. -Walter Blucher.1
Whether through ignorance of the law, political in-
fluence, the belief that mistakes in legislation can be cured
through administrative relief, or magnification of power for
purposes of prestige, the board of appeals in many cities has
become a device of danger rather than safety.-John W. Reps.2
Within the last two decades observers of the land planning
process have suspected that something has gone wrong with the
zoning board of adjustment. It was originally conceived as a
safety valve, as a device to insure that broad zoning regula-
tions do not operate inequitably on particular parcels of land.
It acts as a court of special privilege, granting dispensations to
individuals when compliance with the zoning law results in un-
necessary hardship. With increasing vigor critics have charged
that boards of adjustment pay little attention to the legal limita-
tions on their powers and operate without safeguards adequate to
assure citizens of equal treatment. These are serious charges.
They go to competence, to fairness, to responsibility. But to date,
the proffered supporting evidence has been slim.
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; Visiting Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of California at Los Angeles (Spring, 1962).
" LL.B. 1962, University of Kentucky.
I Blucher, Is Zoning Wagging the Dog?, in Planning 96 (1955
2 Reps, Discretionary Powers of the Board of Zoning Appeal, 20 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 280, 282 (1955).
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Very little factual information on how boards of adjustment
operate is available.3 Boards rarely write opinions, and a tran-
script of the evidence is seldom made. Because of the stagger-
ing number of boards of adjustment throughout the country, a
library of high-fidelity recordings of many hearings before many
boards is well-nigh impossible to obtain. Nonetheless, an em-
pirical case study of a single board of adjustment is possible and
is not without value. We have therefore undertaken to observe
and describe the law in practice before the Lexington-Fayette
County Zoning Board of Adjustment (hereinafter referred to
as the Lexington Board of Adjustment). 4 This Board has juris-
diction over zoning appeals in Lexington and Fayette County,
Kentucky, which in 1960 had a combined population of 181,906.
This study covers a period of seventeen months-from the January,
1960, meeting of the Board through the May, 1961, meeting.5
During this period the Board had before it some 167 cases. How
the Board dealt with these cases will be described in some detail
and will be analyzed in terms of compliance with the legal
norms applicable to the Board's discretionary powers.
From this study we believe some useful conclusions can
be drawn about the operation of zoning boards of adjustment.
We cannot say, of course, that the particular practices of the
Lexington Board are representative of practices of boards else-
where. But we believe the basic functional difficulties inherent
in the traditional concept of a board of adjustment, which are
revealed in the operations of the Lexington Board, will be
present almost anywhere a zoning board of adjustment is estab-
lished. At the end of this article we shall discuss why the power
to grant variances has come to be subject to such abuse and why it
3 For a study suggestive of what needs doing, see Note, Zoning Variances
and Exceptions: The Philadelphia Experience, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 516 (1955).
See also Babcock, The Unhappy State of Zoning Administration in Illinois, 26 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 509 (1959).
4 For an earlier, more limited study, see Note, The Granting of Variances from
the Zoning Ordinance by the Lexington-Fayette County Board of Adjustment, 45
Ky. L.J. 496 (1957).
5 Members of the Board during this period were Grover C. Thompson, Jr.,
attorney, Chairman; John T. Gillig, architect; James L. Jefferson, realtor; Marvin
L. Cassell, businessman; Oscar L. White, businessman (from Jan. 1960 through
Aug. 1960); Strother Kiser, attorney (from Sept. 1960 through May 1961). All
members are appointed for four year terms andserve without compensation. The
senior author wishes to thank the chairman, Grover C. Thompson, Jr., for his un-failing courtesy and helpful ess to numerous students who have, from time to time
over the past several years, sat in on Board meetings.
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is unrealistic to suppose that a board of adjustment can function
properly within the legal framework of our traditional zoning
system. We shall suggest that the law is out of joint and that our
system of land use control is badly in need of reform and ration-
alization.
The fact that legal norms governing the Board's actions
do not satisfy needs and demands of contemporary society re-
specting land use should be kept in mind in reading the first
six sections of this study. In these sections we appraise the
Board's actions by these norms, and the resulting picture is not
a flattering one. It is necessarily distorted by the narrow purpose
in view: comparing action with norms. A more realistic ap-
praisal requires a wider perspective, which we attempt to bring
to the problem in the last section of this article.
I. PROCEDURE BEFORE THE LEXINGTON
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
Under the state enabling act the Board of Adjustment has
original jurisdiction to hear applications for variances and special
exceptions to the zoning ordinance.6 It may also hear appeals
from an interpretation of the ordinance by the building inspector.
As a matter of administrative convenience, however, the Board
never acts except on appeal from the building inspector, even in
cases where it has original jurisdiction. Thus the first step every
applicant must take is to apply to the building inspector for a
building permit or certificate of occupancy. If the applicant,
or any adjacent property owner, is dissatisfied with the building
inspector's decision, he may then appeal to the Board.
The Board's rules require that any appeal must be filed within
twenty days of the building inspector's decision. It must be
accompanied by all plans filed with the inspector, a map of the
property in question, and a letter of appeal (hereinafter collec-
tively called "the petition"). After receipt of the petition, the
Board sets a time for a public hearing and gives notice thereof
in a local newspaper. As a courtesy the Board also sends post-
6Ky. Rev. Stat. § 100.450 (1960).
7Ky. Rev. Stat. § 100.450 (1960). The rules referred to in the text are set
forth in Lexington-Fayette County Zoning Board of Adjustment, Rules and Pro-
cedure (Jan. 1961) [hereinafter cited as "Board of Adjustment Rules"].
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card notices to all adjacent property owners advising them of
the appeal and time of hearing.
After the petition has been received, the Board refers the
case to a member of the planning commission staff. The staff
member examines the petition, inspects the property, and files
a written investigation report stating whether the Board has
power to grant the petition and making recommendations on the
merits. This report sets forth the facts of the case, including
any pertinent information acquired through inspection of the
property (e.g., the presence or absence of nonconforming uses
in the area). It usually also contains a clearer statement of the
legal issues involved than does the petition. Almost all of the
petitions, including many drafted by counsel, were poorly drafted,
stating inadequate legal grounds for relief. Doubtless this is
largely due to the unfamiliarity of lawyers and property owners
with zoning law, which has developed rapidly during the last
thirty years, and to the failure of the Board to require petition-
ers to frame their petitions with reference to the applicable legal
standards.
The Board meets one afternoon every month to hear appeals.
On an average afternoon the Board hears from ten to twelve cases.
At the hearing the Board hears all evidence introduced by the
petitioner, the planning staff, and any protestants. The Board
has sometimes taken the view that petitioner need not appear
in person or by counsel at the hearing; the appeal can be granted
on the basis of the petition alone." At other times the Board
has refused to hear the case until the petitioner was represented
by counsel.9
Procedure at these hearings is very informal. A large pro-
portion of petitioners and protestants appear in person without
counsel before the Board; consequently the rules of evidence are
almost wholly dispensed with in the typical case. The Court
of Appeals has sanctioned this informality.
The Board of Adjustment and Appeals, for lack of a more
accurate term, is a quasi-judicial body with limited powers,
and proceedings before it are, necessarily, more or less
s Application of Poole and Jefferson, May 1961. [Hereinafter cases before the
Board will simply be cited by the name of the applicant and the date.]
9 Sinclair Oil, Feb. 1960; Fugazzi Business College, June 1960.
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informal. A wide latitude in the manner of presenting their
respective views should be afforded the parties before the
board, and technical rules of procedure should not be too
zealously enforced.10
At the outset of the hearing the parties are asked if they wish
to take proof for the purpose of preparing a record for appeal
to the circuit court. If they do, they must bring in a stenographer
at their own expense. If they do not, as is commonly the case,
a secretary merely takes some notes of what was said and done at
the public hearing and at the executive session following. These
notes serve as "Minutes of the Board of Adjustment," which are
required by the enabling act.' They usually consist of no more
than a brief paragraph stating the relief sought, some of the
contentions of the petitioner, any objections raised by the plan-
ning staff or protestants, the number of protestants present, and
the decision rendered. Sometimes the minutes also will state what
point the Board discussed in executive session, but very seldom
do they report any reasons given by the Board for its action.
Direct quotations, attributed to members of the Board, are most
rare. Thus it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine what
was the basis of the Board's decision in most cases.
Appeals may be taken from the Board to the circuit court to
determine whether the Board acted in excess of its power, but
the decision of the Board is conclusive on all questions of fact,
where there is substantial evidence to support the decision.12
Since the cases before the Board usually involve mixed questions
of law and fact, or discretion dependent upon certain findings of
fact, and since the appellant has the burden of showing on appeal
that there is no substantial supporting evidence, where he does not,
at his own expense, bring in a stenographer and make a record,
he has ordinarily foreclosed judicial review. Inasmuch as the
Board usually will not grant a rehearing for the sole purpose of
taking proof, the petitioner must choose before the initial hearing
whether to bear the extra expense of a stenographer and save his
chances for review. Commonly he chooses to avoid that expense
and gamble on favorable Board action. Thus, as a practical mat-
ter, in a large majority of cases the decision of the Board of
10 Goodrich v. Selligman, 298 Ky. 863, 866, 183 S.W.2d 625, 627 (1944).
"Ky. Rev. Stat. § 100.440(2) (1960).
32 Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 100.480, 100.490 (1960).
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Adjustment is final. Indeed, of the 167 cases in our study, only
two were appealed, and only one of these was successful.
II. VARIANCES
A. TE LEGAL BEQUIBEMENrS FOR GRANTiNG VARLANcEs
Because of the difficulty in drawing a general zoning ordin-
ance which takes into account all the various existing shapes,
sizes, topographical features, and peculiar conditions of every lot
in the city, most zoning enabling acts provide for a board of
adjustment to grant relief by way of variance where the restric-
tions contained in the ordinance cause the owner "practical dif-
ficulty" or "unnecessary hardship." The Kentucky enabling act
is no exception. If a city or county decides to adopt a zoning
ordinance, the enabling act requires that a board of adjustment
be established with power to "authorize, upon application for
variance, such variances from the terms of the ordinance or of any
plans, rules, or regulations made thereunder, as will not be con-
trary to the public interest, where a literal enforcement of the
provisions of the ordinance, plans, rules or regulations would
result in unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit of the or-
dinance shall be observed and substantial justice done." 3
The words "unnecessary hardship" were held in a few early
cases in other jurisdictions to be too general and indefinite to
furnish a standard to guide the board, and therefore the power
to grant variances was held an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority. Although the issue of unconstitutionality
has never been expressly decided in Kentucky, the Court of
Appeals has assumed the act to be constitutional in many cases
upholding a board's decision denying or granting a variance. 4
It seems fairly certain that if the issue were now raised the court
would follow the overwhelming majority of courts and hold the
board's power constitutional. By reason of judicial interpreta-
tions of "unnecessary hardship" over the last three decades, that
standard is not nearly so vague as would appear at first glance.
13 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 100.470(1)(c) (1960).
14 See, e.g., Smith v. Selligman, 270 Ky. 69, 109 S.W.2d 14 (1937). Cf. Kline
v. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 325 S.W.2d 324
(Ky. 1959) (dicta that statute "sharply limits" and 'narrows in a drastic man-
ner, the board's authority to grant variances).
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The Lexington-Fayette County Zoning Ordinance-Resolution,
read with the judicial gloss put upon its language, lays down five
conditions that must all exist before there is "unnecessary hard-
ship" and before a variance can be granted.15 They are:
1. Because of exceptional conditions respecting the dimen-
sions or topography of the lot, or some other extraordinary con-
dition, the land in question cannot yield a reasonable return or
has no reasonable use if it must comply with the zoning regula-
tions. The fact that the owner could make a greater profit by
using the land in a nonconforming way is, by itself, no ground
for a variance. The Court of Appeals, along with other courts,
has so held.' The question is whether the property can be put to
any conforming use with a fair and reasonable return, not whether
the ordinance precludes its most profitable use.' 7
2. The hardship must not be self-created.'8
3. The exceptional conditions must be peculiar to the par-
ticular lot and not caused by general conditions in the neigh-
borhood. Or, as the New York Court of Appeals said in the
leading case of Otto v. Steinhilber,19 it must be shown "that the
plight of the owner is due to unique circumstances and not to
15 Lexington-Fayette County Zoning Ordinance-Resolution §§ 24.4221, 24.4222(1961) [hereinafter referred to as "Lexington Zoning Ordinance!].
24.4221 Where by reason of exceptional narrowness, shallowness, or
shape of a specific piece of property at the time of enactment of this Ordi-
nance-Resolution, or by reason of exceptional topographic conditions, or
other extraordinary and exceptional situation or condition on such piece of
property, the strict application of any provision of this Ordinance-Resolu-
tion would result in peculiar and exceptional practical difficulties or excep-
tional and undue hardship upon the owner of such property, the Board shall
have the power to authorize, upon appeal, a variance from such strict appli-
cation, so as to relieve such difficulties or hardships; provided such relief
may be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and with-
out substantially impairing the intent and purposes of this Ordinance-
Resolution.
24.4222 No grant or variance shall be authorized unless the Board spe-
cifically finds that the condition or situation of the specific piece of property
for which the variance is sought is not of so typical or recurrent a nature
as to make reasonably practicable the formulation of a general regulation,
as a part of this Ordinance-Resolution for such conditions or situations.
36 Moore v. City of Lexington, 809 Ky. 671, 218 S.W.2d 7 (1948); Schloemer
v. City of Louisville, 298 Ky. 286, 182 S.W.2d 782 (1944).
17 A recent case containing an excellent exposition of this requirement is
Crossroads Recreation v. Broz, 4 N.Y.2d 89, 149 N.E.2d 65 (1958). See also
Devany v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 132 Conn. 537, 45 A.2d 828 (1946).
18 See Arrow Transp. Co. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of Paducah, 299
S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 1956); Moore v. City of Lexington, 309 Ky. 671, 218 S.W.2d
7 (1948); Selligman v. Van Allmen Bros., 297 Ky. 121, 179 S.W.2d 207 (1944);
accord, Caccia v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 118 A.2d 870 (R.I. 1955).
19282 N.Y. 71, 24 N.E.2d 851 (1939). See Note, Zoning Variances: The
"Unnecessary Hardship" Rule, 8 Syracuse L. Rev. 85 (1956), discussing the
formula set forth in the Otto case.
19621
KENTUcKy LAW JoUPRNAL
the general conditions in the neighborhood which may reflect
the unreasonableness of the zoning ordinance itself."20 If the
owner's plight is due to general conditions in the neighborhood,
his remedy is rezoning, not variance."'
4. The conditions must not be so typical or recurrent with
respect to many pieces of property that they can be dealt with
by a general regulation in the ordinance. 22 This requirement
reflects the policy that problems which recur in many areas
should be dealt with by the Planning Commission, not by the
Board of Adjustment.
5. The variance will not alter the essential character of the
neighborhood nor result in substantial detriment to the public
health, safety, or general welfare. Factors to be considered here
include the suitability of the proposed use to the character of
the neighborhood, the loss in value of nearby properties which
will be caused by the variance, and the harm to the public
compared with the hardship suffered by the owner. 3
The requirements set forth in the ordinance for granting
a variance are, generally speaking, the requirements that have
been evolved by the courts in defining "unnecessary hardship."24
Even without such provisions in the ordinance, a board of ad-
justment's power to grant variances would be limited by sub-
stantially the same requirements by case law.25 Inasmuch as a
variance is by law permitted only when all these requirements
are met, it will be necessary to keep these requirements in mind
in appraising the decisions of the Lexington Board of Adjust-
ment.
20 Id. at 76, 24 N.E.2d at 853.
21 See Arrow Transp. Co. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of Paducah, 299
S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 1956); Bray v. Beyer, 292 Ky. 162, 166 S.W.2d 290 (1942);
accord, Stavola v. Bulkeley, 134 Conn. 186, 56 A.2d 645 (1957); Clark v.
Board of Zoning Appeals of Hempstead, 801 N.Y. 86, 92 N.E.2d 903 (1950);
Appeal of the Catholic Cemeteries Ass'n, 379 Pa. 516, 109 A.2d 537 (1955).
22 Cf. Smith v. Selligman, 270 Ky. 69, 109 S.W.2d 14 (1937).
23 See Moore v. City of Lexington, 309 Ky. 671, 218 S.W.2d 7 (1948);
LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago. 5 111.2d 344, 12 N.E.2d 609 (1955);
Moriarty v. Pozner, 21 N.J. 199, 121 A.2d 527 (1956); Rain or Shine Box Lunch
Co. v. Board of Adjustment of Newark, 53 N.J. Super. 252, 147 A.2d 67 (1958).
24 Se1 Rathkopf & Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning 647-718
(3d ed. 1960); Reps, .supra note 2, at 282-89; Note, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1396
(1961). Except for the requirement that the hardship not he self-created, these
requirements are also set forth in the rules of the Board of Adjustment. Board
of Adjustment Rules, pp. 2-3.
25 See Green, The Power of the Zoning Board of Adjustment to Grant Vari-
ances from the Zoning Ordinance, 29 N.C.L. Rev. 245 (1951).
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B. USE VARIANCE CASES
1. The power of the Board to grant use variances.
Variances can be divided into two types: use variances and
bulk variances. A use variance allows a structure or use in a
district restricted against such structure or use. A bulk variance
gives the property owner relief from some ordinance require-
ment with respect to area, height, setback, parking spaces, and
such. He still uses the property for a conforming use, but he
does not have to comply with some bulk regulation.
Use variances have generally been thought to be much more
destructive of the values sought by zoning. Courts have viewed
them unfavorably and have hedged them in by taking a strict
view of the evidence necessary to satisfy the requirements set
forth above. Indeed, it is arguable that the Kentucky Court of
Appeals has taken the position that the power given a board
of adjustment to grant variances does not include the power to
grant use variances.
In Bray v. Beyer"0 the Board of Adjustment of Paducah
granted a use variance permitting a gasoline lling station in a
residential district, from which it was excluded by the ordin-
ance. In reversing the Board, the court said:
However, the power of authorizing special exceptions
to and variations from the general provisions of the zoning
law is designed to be exercised only under exceptional
circumstances and not for the purpose of amending the
law or changing its scheme in essential particulars such
as making changes in boundary lines of districts or author-
izing the erection of a building forbidden by the zoning
law to be erected. (Italics supplied.)
We think the action of the Board of Adjustment in the
instant case violated the spirit of the ordinance and
amounted to legislation by it. Furthermore, there is no
showing that a literal enforcement of the provisions of the
ordinance with respect to the Beyer lot will result in un-
necessary hardship.27
It is difficult to know precisely what the court held in the case.
The italicized language can be interpreted as meaning that the
board cannot grant a use variance. Or it could be interpreted as
26 292 Ky. 162, 166 S.W.2d 290 (1942).
27 Id. at 167, 166 S.W.2d at 293.
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meaning that a board has no power to grant a variance for a
use that is expressly prohibited in the ordinance (as contrasted
with a use that is excluded only because it is not on the list of
permissive uses). However, the addition of the last line in the
quotation-which was the last line in the opinion-implies that
had there been proof of hardship the result might have been
different.
In a recent case, Arrow Transp. Co. v. Planning & Zoning
Comnn of Paducah,28 the court dealt with this problem again.
Here the board granted a variance for the erection of gasoline
storage facilities in a general business (B-3) zone. Under the
ordinance such facilities could be constructed only in an M-2
zone. The Court of Appeals reversed, citing the Beyer case and
italicizing the language italicized in the above quotation. To
grant the variance, said the court, "would in effect change the
property from a B-3 zone to an M-2 zone." Here again, if the
court had stopped, the holding would be read as prohibiting a
use variance. But the court did not stop. As in Beyer, it added
a concluding thought: "It is difficult to understand how Gulf
could suffer a hardship in the restriction on the use of a property
it does not yet own." And then it dismissed the hardship point
by invoking the rule that a person with only an option to pur-
chase cannot claim hardship.29
Although the question is not entirely free from doubt, we
believe the Court of Appeals did not hold in these cases that a
use variance cannot be granted. In our opinion both these cases
rest upon the lack of evidence showing that the property was
not reasonably adaptable to a conforming use.30 If this evidence
were shown and the other requirements met-which admittedly
will be a rare case-we think the Court of Appeals would affirm
allowance of a use variance. In any event, in appraising deci-
sions of the Board of Adjustment, it is only fair to interpret the
law, where ambiguous, in a manner favorable to the Board.
We must give it the benefits of any doubts. Therefore, we as-
28299 S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 1957).29 This is a rule of doubtful soundness. It is not the purchaser who brings
the hardship into being. It either exists, or does not exist, both before and after
his purchase. See School Committee of City of Pawtucket v. Zoning Bd. of Review
of City of Pawtucket, 133 A.2d 734 (R.I. 1957); Murphy v. Kramer, 182
N.Y.S.2d 205 (1958), criticizing and rejecting the rule.
80 Cf. Smith v. Selligman, 270 Ky. 69, 109 S.W.2d 14 (1937).
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sume it may grant use variances when the requirements of the
ordinance are met.
2. Use variance cases, before the Board.
Between January, 1960, and June, 1961, there were twelve
requests for use variances. The Board denied seven and granted
three. One has not yet been disposed of. One request was granted
as a use variance, but in fact the use was permitted in the dis-
trict as a special exception.
Requests for the following use variances were denied:
1. a business parking lot in an R-1 district3 ' (this use is
first permitted in an R-2 district);
2. a laundry pick-up station in an R-3 district32 (this
use is first permitted in a B-1 district);
3. a light industrial plant in a B-1 district33 (this use is
first permitted in an I-1 district);
4. dividing a one-family house into three apartments
in an I-1 districtO4 (new dwellings or apartments are ex-
pressly prohibited in a I-1 district);
5. a duplex in an R-1 district (two requests)3 5 (du-
plexes are first permitted in an R-2 district);
6. keeping goats in an R-3 district 6 (goats are per-
mtted only in an agricultural district).
31R.A. Cormey, March 1960.32 Fred Sowell and Jay Weaver, Sept. 1960.
s Ralph Delph, July 1960.34 Alberta A. McMahan, April 1960. A bit of pathos is exhibited in the
petition of this woman, caught up in the mysteries of the zoning and rezoning
process. She stated: "Renting my houses is the only means I have to make honest
living as I have no one to help me and if I am allowed to rent what I have,
I do want it rezoned back to residential as I did not ask for it to be zoned
industrial, it was unbenoence to me and I am asking for exceptions." [Sic] The
Board of Health has since started proceedings to condemn her "apartments" as
unfit for human habitation.
85 Sally Dunlap, April 1961; R. T. Jordon, May 1960.36H. M. Pmther, June 1960. Twenty-five protestants appeared. They ob-
jected to "the foul odor." They alleged that the goats ate the neighbors' hedges
and trees (including one "imported" tree which had "a distinctive connection with
the Civil War") and went into the neighbors' yards to die. They further claimed
that petitioner already had at least six dogs and several chickens "that ran wild,"
and that these were enough animals in anybody's backyard. Over thirty com-
plaints had been lodged with the building inspector within the preceding few
weeks.
Petitioner answered that the neighbors were only complaining out of spite,
that the goats kept his backyard clean and free of insects, and that sick people
needed goats milk. He concluded that there could be "no rational objection
to the presence of the animals."
This was the only comic relief that appeared in seventeen months. Such is
the life of a board memberl
1962]
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In none of these cases was there any evidence in the minutes
of the Board or in the petition that the petitioner had met even
one of the requirements for a variance set forth above. If no
additional evidence was presented at the hearing, the Board
had no authority to grant the requests, and they were prop-
erly denied.
Requests for the following use variances were granted:
1. a business parking lot in an R-1 district 7 (this use is
first permitted in an R-2 district). The only difference
we can see between this case and another case where the
same type of variance was denied38 is that here petitioner
wanted to use the parking lot for his employees. Where
petitioner wanted to use the parking lot for his customers
the variance was denied. This distinction may be sound,
from a planning viewpoint, since a customers' parking
lot, with in-and-out traffic, may be more destructive of
residential values than an employees' parking lot. But
according to our basic assumptions about the Board's
function and the limitations upon its power to grant vari-
ances, the fact that it might not be bad planning to permit
an employees' parking lot in a residential zone is in-
sufficient ground for a variance. The Planning Commis-
sion could have drawn this distinction in the zoning or-
dinance, but the Board is not authorized to draw it un-
less the other requirements for a variance have been met.
Neither the petition nor the minutes show any allegation or
evidence of "no reasonable return" or of "unique circum-
stances" or that other requirements for a variance were met.
2. three apartments in one house in an R-2 two-family
residence district 9 (this use is first permitted in an R-3
district). The only evidence of hardship was that peti-
tioners had bought this building under the impression
that they could rent legally three apartments in the house.
Five neighbors protested, alleging the apartments were
rented to "very undesirable people." The Board granted
the variance on the condition "that the appellants care-
fully screen their tenants." (How will the building inspec-
tor enforce this condition?) If this was all the evidence
introduced, the Board was without power to grant this
variance. The fact that petitioner bought the property
37 James M. Carr, Dec. 1960.
38R. A. Cormey, March 1960. Both pieces of property were located next
to "B districts. In both cases neighbors objected to the proposed use.39 J. H. and Mary Hutchins, Aug. 1960.
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erroneously believing it to be zoned for three apartments is,
of course, immaterial.
3. a gasoline filling station in an R-1 district40 (this
use is first permitted in a B-1 district). Petitioner in this
case had applied to the Planning Commission in Novem-
ber, 1957, for a zone change, which had been denied. Some
thirteen neighbors protested granting a variance. Al-
though there is no evidence of record that he met any of
the requirements for a variance, the Board granted the vari-
ance. The facts in this case are almost identical with the
facts in Bray v. Beyer,41 where the petitioner was granted
a variance for a filling station in a residential zone after
the Planning Commission had refused to grant him a zone
change. The Court of Appeals held the Board had no
power to grant such a variance. This case is probably the
worst single example of the Board's abuse of its power dur-
ing the seventeen months covered by this study.
These are the only cases where the Board granted use vari-
ances as such. In none of them was there any evidence on record
that could even come close to satisfying the legal requirements
for a variance. The report of the planning staff submitted to
the Board in each case recommended denial of these use vari-
ances.
There are two peculiar cases involving use variances which
cannot be classified as either granted or denied. Both involved
permits for billboards. In the Application of Russell Michae42
the petitioner asked for a permit to construct a billboard adver-
tising the Jolly Roger restaurant in an A-1 district in the county.
It was assumed by the planning staff, Michaels lawyer, and the
Board that billboards were not permitted in A-1 districts.4 3 But
everyone had overlooked a 1954 ordinance change which per-
mitted billboards in any A-1 district outside the city limits as a
special exception. The Board first denied, then granted the peti-
tion as a use variance. But in fact the petitioner needed no use
variance at all, only a special exception.
40 Brooking Gex, Dec. 1960.
41292 Ky. 162, 166 S.W.2d 290 (1942). See also Sims v. Bradley, 309 Ky.
626, 218 S.W.2d 641 (1949).42 Denied June 1960, reversed and granted Dec. 1960.
43 heBoard is quoted as saying, "this use is specifically first permitted
in the B-2 district so the Board does not have the authority to grant said permit
in an A-1 district." Minutes of the Lexington-Fayette County Zoning Board of
Adjustment, June 1960, p. 27. [These minutes are hereinafter referred to as
"Minutes of the Board of Adjustment.]
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In the Application of Nat'l Advertising Co.," the petitioner
wanted a variance for the erection of two billboards, one in an
A-1 district in the county (where, as in Michael, it was erron-
eously assumed billboards were prohibited), and one in an R-1
district. At the hearing the building inspector testified that the
petitioner previously had erected illegally forty-seven billboards.
The Board denied the variance for the two signs, and in addi-
tion it ordered the billboards illegally erected removed. On a
petition for rehearing the billboard company claimed that it was
improper to order the standing billboards removed since they
were not the subject matter of the case; it further claimed that
some of the billboards were not erected illegally. The Board
granted a stay of its order and requested the sign company and
the building inspector to come to some agreement on the facts.
Today, eighteen months later, the case is still pending.
It should also be noted that the Board may have, in effect,
granted use variances under its power to grant home occupa-
tions. The Board granted as "home occupations" in residential
districts three electrical and television repair shops45 and in an
agricultural district one printing shop.46 Because of the nature
of these uses, permitting them as home occupations comes close
to varying the use.
C. BULK VARIANCE CASES BEFORE THE BOAD
1. Bulk variances (excluding variances for signs).
By far the largest number of any kind of request was for a
bulk variance. The Board acted on fifty cases involving fifty-one
such requests (not including requests for sign variances). Of
these requests the board granted forty-four-or 88%-and denied
seven. Most of these requests were for variations in the side
yard, setback, distance, area, and parking space requirements
of the ordinance.
Although this percentage of petitions approved is quite high,
it would be justified if the Board acted within its powers and
44 May 1960.
45 Stanley Caywood, May 1960 (repair electric irons, mowers, etc.); Fred
Hale, May 1960 (repair electric tools); Herman F. Smith, March 1961 (repair
TV sets).
46 Holton Wilson, Dec. 1960.
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granted only those petitions which met the requirements of
hardship.4 7 However, the hard fact is that in not more than a
dozen of these petitions did the petitioner plead uniqueness of
the lot and attempt to show evidence that would meet the legal
requirements.4 Usually the petition stated that the petitioner
could profit by the variance, that he needed extra living space
for his large family or extra room for his booming business, that
the proposed building would be "useful to this business," or,
most frequently (in about fifty percent of the cases), that there
were other nonconforming buildings in the area. After investi-
gating the facts, the planning staff recommended granting twenty
of the fifty-one requests. On the basis of the facts alleged in the
petition and the evidence in the minutes, in not more than twenty,
or approximately forty percent, of these cases were the legal
requirements for a variance satisfied.
Denials and apparent inconsistencies. The seven requests
denied by the Board included two requests to vary the bulk re-
quirements so that garages could be converted into apartments,
49
and one to allow four houses to be built on a one acre lot" (the
ordinance required one-half acre per house). The other four
cases" involved requests which seemed to be similar in many
respects to requests that were granted: (a) to relax the bulk re-
quirements because the lot size could not accommodate an old
house or because it had been reduced by eminent domain; (b) to
relax the side yard requirements so as to permit a carport. We
shall discuss them briefly.
47 For cases showing how these requirements can be met because of unusual
topography and small lot size, see Stout v. Jenkins, 268 S.W.2d 643 (Ky. 1954);
Willoughby v. Tafel, 309 Ky. 753, 218 S.W.2d 977 (1949).
48 One of these was Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., Dec. 1960. The architectural
firm that drew the plans for the building, which violated the bulk requirements
of the ordinance, was listed on the building construction plans filed with the build-
ing inspector as J. T. Gillig and Associates. Mr. Gillig was a member of the Board
of Adjustment. Site plans submitted as part of the petition to the Board were
identical with the construction plans, except that the architect's title block had been
removed. The Board granted the variance by unanimous vote, with all members,
including Gillig, present.
49 Coleman Updike, Oct. 1960; Fred E. Littleton, Dec. 1960. The latter
case was reversed and variance granted in July 1961, after the end of our
study. In Moore v. City of Lexington, 309 Ky. 671, 218 S.W.2d 7 (1948), the
court affirmed the Board's denial of a variance to convert servants' quarters
over a garage into an apartment.
50 Morris Mofley, July 1960, rehearing denied Oct. 1960. Compare Forrest
Kirby, Jan. 1961, where variance of acreage requirement was granted.
M' Rector Allen, Jan. 1960; Brooks Barnes, March 1960; McKnights, Inc., May
1960; Charles E. Snow, Aug. 1960.
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The Board had two requests for permits to move houses onto
lots where they would violate bulk requirements. The Board
denied one5 2 and granted one.-3 The petition of Brooks Barnes
was denied because "moving of an old structure to this lot would
be detrimental to property owners of the relatively new resi-
dences in the neighborhood." 4 The petition of Joe Hall, whose
house and part of his land had been condemned by the state
under eminent domain, was granted. As is the usual practice
in Kentucky, the state in a gesture of generosity permitted Hall
to move the house off the acquired parcel even though the
state had paid for it. It had little or no value to the state. Hall
wanted to move the house to the remaining portion of his land
in an industrial area. This remaining portion was too small for
Hall to comply with the bulk zoning requirements for a house.
Even though Hall had been paid for the house and presumably
for damage to his remaining land, had he been able to prove
that the zoning ordinance deprived his land of any reasonably
beneficial use, he would have had a good case for a variance.
But the report of the planning staff indicated that the remaining
portion of his lot had considerable value for industrial and com-
mercial use. Nonetheless, Hall had his cake and ate it too.
Although the Hall case can be distinguished from the Barnes
case in terms of the effect upon the neighborhood, it is not easy
to see how it can be distinguished from the Application of Rector
Allen.55 Part of Allen's land in front of his filling station had
been condemned, leaving room on only one side of his pumps
for cars to park. He asked for permission to move his pumps
out a few feet in front of the setback line in order to have room
for cars on each side of the pumps. The Board denied the ap-
peal, saying that he had received "just compensation" from the
state. If Allen could not complain because he had been paid by
the state for his hardship, it is perhaps permissible to ask, how
could Joe Hall complain?
The Board had before it four requests for permission to main-
52 Brooks Barnes, March 1960.
53 Joe Hall, March 1961.
54 Minutes of the Board of Adjustment, March 1960, p. 15:
55 Jan. 1960.
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tain carports which were erected without permits and in viola-
tion of side yard requirements. It denied two, granted one, and
allowed one to remain as a temporary use. The first request
was from Julian Cobb, which was granted in April, 1960. In
May, 1960-one month later-the Board denied the request of an
owner of a lot located two doors down the street from Cobb, and
ordered the carport torn down.56 In August of that year the
Board denied the third request.57 In October the fourth request
met the same fate, but in April, 1961, the Board reversed itself
and allowed the carport to remain as "a temporary use."" We
found nothing in the petitions or in the minutes which indicated
any one of these lots was unique. From the record we find it
difficult, if not impossible, to rationalize their different disposi-
tions.
Petitions after violation; rehearings and reversals. In these
bulk variance cases the Board was frequently faced with
two problems which usually result from public unawareness
of the zoning law. The first is an appeal for a building
permit after the structure has been erected in violation of the
bulk requirements of the ordinance. There were twelve such
appeals before the Board.59 In three the Board denied the permit
and ordered the structures torn down. Two of these were the
May and August carport cases mentioned above. The other was
a case where a man had built four houses on a one-acre lot,
which violated the area requirements of one-half acre per house.0°
Of the nine such appeals granted, six involved cases where
buildings were erected, two where carports were erected, and
one where a canopy was erected. One of these violations was
caused by an honest mistake as to the property line,61 and an-
56 McKnights, Inc., May 1960.
5 7 Charles E. Snow, Aug. 1960.5 8 Import Motors, Oct. 1960 and April 1961.
59 There were also eleven petitions for sign variances requested after the
sign had been erected. Nine were granted. See text accompanying note 109 infra.
Expenditure of money for prohibited uses is a self-created hardship and therefore
not a ground for a variance. Misuk v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 138 Conn. 477, 86
A.2d 180 (1952); Selligman v. Van Allmen Bros., 297 Ky. 121, 179 S.W.2d 207
(1944).
60 Morris Mofley, July 1960, rehearing denied Oct. 1960. The Board of Ad-
justment may have been influenced by the refusal of the Board of Health to issue
plumbing permits.
61 R. C. Coomer, Nov. 1960.
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other resulted partially from an error of the building inspector. 2
In the latter case the petitioner, an experienced builder, ob-
tamed a permit through error on the part of the building in-
spector. After the foundation had been poured, the error was
discovered and a "stop order" issued. The petitioner disregarded
it, substantially completed the buildiiag, and then appealed to
the Board, alleging as a hardship that he could iiot. buy any
adjoining land to meet the bulk requirements. Ia still another
case,6 3 also involving an expeneilced builder, the violation re:
suited from relying upon newspaper accounts of the Board's ac-
tion. In February, 1960, the builder had applied for a variance
to permit a canopy over gas pumps iii a filling statioii and for a
variance to permit a free standinig sign. The Board demed th6
first variance and granted the second. In an account of thd
Board's action a local newspaper reported that the builders re-
quest had been granted, not fiotiiig that there had beei two
requests. Petitioner alleged that he relied on the newspaper ac-
count, never saw the periit as it was issued, and went ahead
and built his canopy At its December, 1961, meeting, the Board
told him the newspaper was not the official record of the Board,
reheard his case, and granted the variance.
A related problem, perhaps attributable to public ignorance
of zofiing law, is the problem of frequent rehearings. Although
a board of adjustment may make rules regulating procedure be-
fore it, the general rule is that it raty not re-open or re-hear
an application which has once been terminted except upon al
allegation of new facts.64 Tis rule is incorporated in the Lex-
ington Board's rules of procedure. 65 The Board reheard fourteen
rbases, usually, but not always, upon allegation of new facts. In
ten it reversed itself and granted variances which previously
had been denied. From tls high number of reversals it can be
inferred that petitioners often come to the first hearing ill-pre-
pared to meet the issues, perhaps because they do not know
what the issues are.
62 Foley Realty Co., Jan. 1961. Estoppel may not be invoked as a defense
where permit L s erroneously issued by the building inspector. Selligman v. West-
ern & So. Life Ins. Co., 277 Ky. 551, 126 S.W.2d 419 (1938).63 Phillips Petroleum, demed Feb. 1960, reversed and granted Dec. 1960
(Thompson and Gillig dissenting).
64 1 Rathkopf & Rathkopf, op. cit. supra note 24, at 69,65 Board of Adjustment Rules, p. 4.
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Concluswo: If we judge the Board'i actions by the standards
set forth at the beginnng of this section on variances, the con-
clusion seems iiescapable that in a great number bf these cases
the Board abused its discretioh, in that there were no allega-
tions or evidence of legal hardship m the petitions, no substan-
tial evidence in the mihutes to support any finding of hardship,
and no flndings that conditions or hardships alleged were not
typical or recurrent (a finding which section 24.4222 of the
zoning ordinance expressly makes a prerequisite for a variance
in every case) It is of course .possible that evidence which
satisfied the legal requiremeits for a variance was introduced
at the hearing and did iot find its way into the minutes. We
think this is inprobable, however, in any substantial numlber
of cases in view of our 0owVn observation of Board hearings and
of written reports from student observers who have sat in on
Board meetings from time to time over the past five years.
This conclusion about the actions of the Lexington Board
will not surprise anyone with experience in zoning administra-
tion: A few years ago Walter Blucher, who has as wide a knowl-
edge of planning administration as anyone in the country, reached
the same conclusion about all zoning boards of adjustment. He
statbd:
The vi6lations of zoning are to be found at every level
6f the administrative and legislative process. I have said
that in my opinion 50 percent of 0ll the rulings of zoning
boards of appeals in the United States are probably illegal
usurj5ations 6f bwef. 66
tlucher s observation is indeed disquieting, but such widespread
"illegal usurpations of power" should make us wonder whether
the fault lies as much in the system as iii the men who run it.
We shall examine this questioi at the end of our study of the
Lexington Board.
2. Bulk varances for sigrs.
In this subsection we present a batch of cases that show
how a board of adjustmetit can rewrite the zoning ordinance
and bring about almost complete breakdown in enforcenent
of the law The cases deal with variances from the zoning regu=
6 OB1ucier, op. dti. supta note I. at 100. See also the despaing remarks of
Judge Maltbie, The Legal Background of Zomng, 22 Conn. 1.J. 2 (1948).
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lations respecting size, location, and number of advertising
signs.6
7
In appraising the propriety of the Board's action, the reader
will remember that a variance for a sign is subject to the same
requirements that any other kind of variance is subject to. These
have been set out above. They are: (1) because of the unique-
ness of the lot, the land will not yield a reasonable return if the
signs must conform to the ordinance; (2) the hardship is not
created by the petitioner; (3) the owner's plight is peculiar to
the lot and not caused by general conditions in the neighborhood;
(4) the conditions are not so typical or recurrent that they can be
dealt with by a general regulation; (5) the variance will not
result in substantial impairment of the community plan.
Between January, 1960, and September, 1960, there were
fourteen requests for a sign variance. Three were granted; eleven
were denied. In September, 1960, one membership of the Board
changed, and so, apparently, did the position of the Board re-
specting sign variances. Between September, 1960, and June,
1961, the Board had twenty-eight requests for a sign variance,
including four requests to reverse earlier decisions. (The plan-
ning staff recommended granting three and denying twenty-
67 The Lexington zoning ordinance requires all permanent signs in resi-
dential districts (except for schools, churches and tourist homes) to be attached
flat against the building. Lexington Zoning Ordinance § 7.32-.36, 8.21, 8.24, 9.34,
9.35, 10.21, 10.24, 10.25, 11.21.
The set-back requirements in the Lexington zoning ordinance respecting
signs in other districts are as follows:
A-1 (agricultural): motels, 25 ft., §§ 20.57, 22.00; other advertising
signs, 60 ft. from center line of highway or 2 ft. from right of way, which-
ever is greater, § 20.4.
B-i (neighborhood business district): motels, 25 ft., §§ 12.33, 20.57,
22.00; filling stations, 12 ft., H§ 12.33, 19.32; other advertising signs, 20 ft.
attached flat against building below the roof line, § 12.33, 20.4, 20.646, 22.00.
B-2 (downtown business district): filling stations, 12 ft. unless attached
flat against building, § 19.32; other advertising signs, none, § 13.32, 20.4,
22.00.
B-3 (highway service district): motels, 25 ft., § 20.57, 22.00; filling
stations, 12 ft., § 19.32; other advertising signs, 20 ft. city, 40 ft. county,§ 20.4, 22.00.
B-4 (general business district): same as B-2.
I-i (light industrial district): motels, 5 ft. city, 10 ft. county, § 20.57,
22.00; filling stations, 12 ft., § 19.32; other advertising signs, 20 ft. city, 40 ft.
county, §§ 20.4, 22.00.
1-2 (heavy industrial district): same as I-I.
There are other requirements in the ordinance dealing with size and number
of signs, but as they are seldom involved in these cases they are not here re-
produced. Most of the requests were for free standing signs, over-the-roof signs,
and signs within the set-back requirement.
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four. It made no recommendation as to one). Of these twenty-
eight requests, twenty-four were granted on first hearing. Two
were first denied and then granted on rehearing. Only two re-
quests were ultimately denied. Thus the current Board granted
ninety-three percent of the requests for sign variances; the
planning staff recommended granting only eleven percent.
In not a single one of these cases did the petitioner in his
petition attempt to show evidence to meet all the requirements
for a variance. Indeed, in very few did the petitioner show
sufficient evidence to meet even one requirement. Various hard-
ships were alleged, such as it was "extremely necessary to the
success of the commercial enterprise," petitioner's sign could
be seen better if it were nonconforming, there were other non-
conforming signs in the area, and the building had been so de-
signed that there was no place to put a conforming sign (clearly
a self-made hardship). None of these so-called "hardships" is
a hardship under the enabling act and ordinance, and none of
them is sufficient reason for granting a variance. The minutes
of the Board are as devoid of substantiating evidence as the
petitions.
One reason for granting sign variances frequently advanced
by the Board was that there were other nonconforming signs
in the area, but in many areas the existing nonconforming signs
were the result of variances previously granted by the Board
itself. New Circle Road is such an area. This road originally was
built in the late 1940's as a high speed by-pass around the north
side of Lexington. After an epic battle over whether or not the
adjacent land should be zoned for business, in which the prin-
cipal protagonists were former County Judge William E. Nichols
(for business zoning) and former Planning Commission Chair-
man Robert D. Hawkins (against business zoning), the forces
for business zoning won the day.68 If, as Bernard DeVoto said,
6S After leading his forces to victory, Judge Nichols was defeated for re-
election in November, 1953. A few days later he fired one of his antagonists,
Russell Scofleld, from the Planning Commission. After serving out his first term,
Scofield had never been officially re-appointed but had continued to sit on the
Commission with Nichols' consent. Scofield filed suit in circuit court, which
temporarily enjoined both Scofleld and the new appointee from serving. The
Planning Commission decided not to hold any more meetings until the issue
could be settled. The crisis was ultimately resolved by the parties agreeing to let
(Footnote continued on next page)
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"a highway is a true index of our culture," the cultural rating of
Lexington ("The Athens of the West") plummeted sharply with
the development of New Circle Road. Today-eight years later-
New Circle Road is lined with drive-ins purveying beds, burgers,
booze, and Bardot, as well as more durable goods-all advertised
by winking, blinking, or fixed illuminated signs. The only part
the Board of Adjustment has played in this garish development
is in granting bulk variances, usually for signs. At the present
time there are numerous signs on New Circle Road within the
setback requirement. All of them have been erected since the
zoning ordinance was passed, and all of them are there as a
result of variances granted by the Board of Adjustment or of
nonenforcement of the ordinance by the building inspector.
During the period of our study there were four requests for
sign variances on the New Circle Road. The first was the Ap-
plication of Joe Isaacs, Jr.,69 which was one of the two sign vari-
ances denied after August, 1960, apparently because the business
on the adjacent lot had a conforming sign. In his petition Isaacs
listed fifty-three nonconforming signs on the New Circle Road
between Liberty Road and Broadway, the stretch of the road on
which his lot was located. The second request was the Applica-
tion of Paul Miller Ford.70 The petitioner wanted to erect a free
standing sign within the forty foot setback requirement on the
same stretch of the road where Isaac's property lay. Contrary to
the decision in Isaacs, the Board granted the request, apparently
because of other nonconforming signs up and down the road.
The third request7 likewise was granted, because there was one
nonconforming sign on the adjacent lot and numerous noncon-
forming signs in the area. The fourth request72 was granted also,
on the ground that there were other nonconforming signs in the
area and the petitioner would be in competition with some of
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
the new Republican county judge name the member. He named a man who had
not been involved in the controversy. For details of the beltline battle, see al-
most any daily issue of the Lexington Herald or the Lexington Leader in 1953;
Morris, The Development of the Belt Line, May 1957 (study on file at the
University of Kentucky College of Law).
69 Oct. 1960.
70 Jan. 1961.
71 George B. Smith, Jan. 1961.
72 Penny's Drive-In, April 1961,
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the businesses that had these nonconforming signs. The Board's
action in these and other sign cases moved the planning staff to
protest strongly in the fourth case:
The Board has, by their own actions, in the past, all but
amended this particular provision of the Zoning Ordin-
ance-Resolution along the Beltline and other arteries. It
is unfortunate that the Board's usurpation of legislative
authority has not been brought to the attention of the
courts before the intent and effect of the Ordinance was
destroyed.738
This "usurpation of legislative authority" has not, as the plan-
ning staff indicated, been confined to the New Circle Road.
Sign variances have been freely granted on other roads, on down-
town streets, and in new shopping centers. The Board's actions
and motivations are well illustrated by the following cases.
They also show, as do the New Circle Road cases, that having
let one nonconforming sign in, the Board feels it cannot deny
others the same privilege.74
In December, 1959, the Board denied a permit to Friseh's
Drive-In for a free standing sign advertising "Big Boys" in Idle
Hour Shopping Center, a new shopping center on the edge of
one of Lexington's finest residential districts. The zoning or-
dinance requires signs in neighborhood shopping centers to be
flat against the building. Nine months later, the Board reheard
the case and upon substantially the same evidence (which did
not meet the legal requirements of hardship) by a 3 to 2 vote
reversed the decision and granted the variance. 5 When the sign
was erected it was the only nonconforming sign in the shopping
center. Eight months later a druggist in the same shopping
center applied for a permit for a free standing sign, stating that
"in order to put his store on a paying basis he has to let the public
know it is there. He further stated that Frisch's restaurant ...
was recently granted a free standing sign and that he feels he
78 Staff report, Penny's Drive-In, supra note 72.74 It has been uniformly held, however, that permitting some persons to
violate a zoning regulation does not preclude its enforcement against others who
conceive themselves to be similarly situated. Matter of Larkin Co. v. Schwab,
241 N.Y. 330, 151 N.E. 637 (1926); Ventresca v. Exley, 358 Pa. 98, 56 A.2d
210 (1948); Miller v. Cain, 40 Wash. 2d 216, 242 P.2d 505 (1952).
75 Frisch's Drive-In, Sept. 1960 (Thompson and Gillig dissenting).
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should be given the same right. 7 6 The Board, not to be charged
with favoritism, granted the variance."
The complete collapse of sign regulation which results from
the Board's ignoring the ordinance and the limitations on its own
powers is well illustrated by three cases involving the new
Gardenside shopping center. As has been stated, the zoning
ordinance provides that in a neighborhood shopping center
a sign must be attached flat against the building. Whatever the
Board of Adjustment may think of the merits of this regulation,
it has no authority to pass upon its merits or to amend the or-
dinance in any way. That is the function of the Planning Com-
mission.
In the first Gardenside case, the Gardenside Pharmacy ap-
plied for a variance to put its symbol (a neon-lit, revolving mortar
and pestle) on top of a canopy which extended across the front
of the building some three feet below the roof line."' It alleged
that the building design was unique and that a revolving sign
could be put only on top of the canopy. (Of course, one purpose
of requiring signs flat against the wall is to prevent the erection
of such revolving signs.) The Board granted the variance. Two
months later another merchant in the same shopping center peti-
tioned for a variance to put his sign above the same canopy."' The
Board denied the permit, 3 to 2. The owner of the shopping cen-
ter then stepped in and applied for a variance for all establish-
ments in the Gardenside shopping center.8 0 The resistance of the
three members who had voted to deny the second merchant a
variance caved in. The Board granted the variance for all the
stores. Doubtless the Board finally decided if it granted a vari-
ance to one it must grant a variance to all since the same canopy
ran across the front of all their shops. But in doing so the Board
in effect amended the ordinance for the shopping center and ig-
nored two primary requirements for a variance: (1) that the
alleged hardship be peculiar to one lot and not the result of con-
ditions general in the neighborhood; (2) that the hardship not be
self-created. The Board got itself into the soup by granting the
76 Minutes of the Board of Adjustment, April 1961,p 28.7 7 Edwin G. Spalding, April 1961 (illig dissenting).78 Sam L. Sexton, March 1961.
7 9 Rowin, Inc., May 1961 (Jefferson and Kiser dissenting).80 Pierson-Trapp Co., Aug. 1961.
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first variance without requiring that the legal conditions for a
variance be met. By not following the law it ended up usurping
the functions of the Planning Commission. The proper course of
action would have been to recommend an amendment to the zon-
ing ordinance.
In the Application of Airport Motel,8' the Board members
gave some of their reasons for taking such a free and easy view
of hardship. There a new, attractive motel was built on the
Versailles Road, one of the most scenic highways through the
horse farm district. The motel was well set back from the high-
way, but the petitioners wanted to put their sign within the
twenty-five foot required setback for signs. At the hearing,
one Board member said, ".... you would not know it was a motel
if they did not have a sign." A member of the planning staff
replied that they could have a sign-but set back from the high-
way. Another Board member then stated that petitioners "have a
quarter of a million dollars investment there and to spend that
much money shows a good faith in the country .... They have
a nice place with a tremendous investment and a man in busi-
ness has got to have a sign to attract the public."82 The vari-
ance was granted.
While the minutes indicate the Board was articulate in this
case, it was not always thus. One of the cases before the Board
involved a petition by one of the members of the Board, and
another builder, for a sign variance.83 They had erected a free
standing sign advertising a doctor's office building in a B-i
zone in violation of an ordinance requirement that signs must be
flat against the wall. In their petition, they gave no reason of
any kind why the variance should be granted. According to the
minutes, they were not represented at the hearing; the peti-
tioning member absented himself from the meeting. The Board
granted the petition without recorded comment or explanation.
Filling station signs. A large number of applicants for
81 Airport Motel, March 1961.8 2 Minutes of the Board of Adjustment, March ,1961, p. 74. One month later
this reason for hardship was advanced by -petitioner in Levy, Pool, and Wenneker,
April 1961: "We feel that a sign with dimensions such as are required by the
Ordinance. ... is not sufficient to advertise a million and a half dollar investment
in this shopping center." The Board, hoist on its own petard, granted the vari-
ance for an extra-large sign.
83 Poole and Jefferson, May 1961. J. L. Jefferson was a member of the Board.
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sign variances were owners of filling stations. They made
fifteen requests-seven for signs within the setback requirement,
seven for signs above the roof line, and one to build a sign larger
than the maximum size permissible. In practically all these cases
the hardship, if any, was self-created by the petitioner since
he had bought the land for the single purpose of erecting a
filling station thereon with full knowledge of the zoning regu-
lations. The principle of Arrow Transp. Co. v Planning & Zoning
Comm'n of Paducah4 would seem to preclude a variance in these
cases. In any event seldom was it alleged in these cases that there
was anything unique about the lot or about the design of a
filling station which would make it difficult to comply with the
sign regulations.
In many of these cases the filling station owners seemed to
regard themselves as a special class with a right to a variance.
The Application of Standard Oil85 is a good example of this,
When this case was first heard in May, 1960, the Board flatly
stated that there were "no .. .unique conditions . . .that may
be considered unnecessary hardship."8 6 The only hardship alleged
was that nearly every other service station in that particular
B-I district had nonconforming signs two feet (rather than the
required twelve feet) from the property line. Standard Oil then
filed a request for a rehearing. At the hearing on the request
for a rehearing, the attorney for Standard Oil stated that the
rehearing should be granted because "the consistent policy of
this Board in approving such signs for filling stations over a
period of several years, has become what might be termed a
'rule of property', and whether that policy was right or wrong,
it should be changed only after public pronouncement of the
change, and the change should be given prospective applica-
tion only."87 The Board apparently agreed, as it announced in
July that "hereafter the Board will conform to the zoning law
84 299 S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 1956). See text accompanying note 29, supra.8 5 Variance denied May 1960, reversed and granted Sept. 1960.
86 Minutes of the Board of Adjustment, May 1960, p. 26.
87 Minutes of the Board of Adjustment, May 1960, p. 82. How this "polic
came to be established is outlined in a Special Report of the Planning Staff
to the Board of Adjustment (Jan. 1960). It reads:
It can certainly be safely said that the Board of Adjustment has been
too liberal, indeed lenient, in its granting of variances. The impact of this
leniency has been at least twofold: first in damaging the public respect for
(Footnote continued on next page)
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for gas stations."8 In September the Board reversed the Stand-
ard Oil decision and granted the permit.
The troubling thing about the Standard Oil case is that the
Board had made the same announcement of requiring con-
formity in July, 1959.89 Moreover, after the announcement in the
Standard Oil case, the Board continued to grant every applica-
tion for a filling station sign variance up to the time our study
ended. After the Standard Oil case the Board granted nine of the
nine requests for filling station sign variances. The first four
were the Applications of Shell OilY0 Shell had four filling stations
in different B-1 districts around the city. One of the stations
was already built, and the sign already erected in violation of
the ordinance. Shell alleged that these stations were all located
in areas where other stations had nonconforming signs, that
each sign was an integral part of the building design, and that
the signs would beautify the city. The planning staff in its report
noted that one of the stations was in an area where there were
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
the Zoning Ordinance, and second in all but destroying certain requirements
of that ordinance.
A good share of the blame for this situation can be put to the Board's
granting of variances without proper proof by the appellant of the existence
of unnecessary hardship.
An excellent example of the violence some of these rulings have done
to the provisions of the Ordinance has been the fate of Article 19.32 per-
taining to filling stations. This article requires, among other things that
l.. no sign . . . shall be located within twelve (12) feet of any street
lot line .... On October 10, 1954, the Board of Adjustment granted the
Standard Oil Co. a permit to erect their sign within 2 feet of the southern
or "inner" right-of-way of New Circle Road at Bryan Station Road. As out-
lined in the staff report of Planning Director William Rogers, exceptional
circumstances did prevail which justified the granting of a temporary vari-
ance. Only the northern or "outer" pavement of New Circle Road was then
completed. Thus, the property line in this case was 40 feet from the existing
pavement. The sign in question would then have been 52 feet from the
existing pavement. The Board permitted the sign to be erected 2 feet from
the right-of-way line, but still 42 feet from the pavement. Rogers' recom-
mendation that conformance to the specifications of the Zoning Ordinance-
Resolution be required when the second pavement of New Circle Road
was completed went unheeded.
Since this case in 1954, there have been 21 additional appeals to the
Board of Adjustment of a similar nature, of which all 21 were granted, and
of which only 2 involved the same unique circumstances of the first case.
The Board had apparently used the original case as precedent to establish
a "policy" of requiring only a 2 foot setback for these filling stations rather
than the required 12 feet of Article 19.32. Not until the Rector Allen case
of the last Board meeting have the requirements of Article 19.32 been
upheld.
Minutes of the Board of Adjustment, July 1960, pp. 36-37.89 Shell Oil Co., July 1959.
90 Shell Oil Co. (four cases), Dec. 1960.
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no nonconforming signs and one was in an area which had
both conforming and nonconforming signs. Nevertheless, the
Board granted all four variances, "because," said a member of
the Board, "the signs are a part of the buildings and because the
stations are located in older established B-1 districts where non-
conformance to this same sign regulation is predominate."91
The reason given in Shell, that the filling stations were located
in older districts with nonconforming signs, could not be given
in the next case to come before the Board, Application of Im-
perial Petroleum.2 But the Board again granted the variance.
In this case, Imperial wished to erect a sign within the setback
requirement and another above the roof of the station. There
was no question of nearby nonconforming signs. Imperial was
located next to an Ashland Oil filling station with conforming
signs in the new Zandale shopping center. 4 The staff report
stated there were no nonconforming signs within one-half mile
of Imperials location. The Board found a new reason for a
variance. Two members of the Board were recorded as saying,
"it is their opinion that operation of the Imperial Petroleum
Company is unique and differs from that of National [sic] known
oil companies in that its products are sold at a cut rate and that
it is necessary that their prices be easily seen in order to attract
the public." 5 One of these went on to say, "if a company or a
person is not successful financially in the operation of a business
it is his opinion that a hardship exists.""6
After the Imperial case the Board granted two sign variances
to the American Oil Company 7 and one to the Spur Oil Com-
pany." In the latter case Spur had illegally erected a free stand-
ing sign four feet from the property line. When it noted that
other filling stations were erecting signs only two feet from the
property line with the Board's permission, it asked, and was
granted, permission to move its sign two feet closer to the street.
91 Minutes of the Board of Adjustment, Dec. 1960, p. 57.
92 Jan. 1961.
93 Thompson and Gillig dissented.
94 Ashland Oil has since moved its sign across the service road to the planting
strip along the highway.
95 Minutes of the Board of Adjustment, Jan. 1961, p. 64.
96 Id. p. 65. The courts appear to take a contrary view. See Rathkopf &
Rathkopf, op. cit. supra note 24, ch. 42.9 7 American Oil Co. (two cases), Jan. 1961.9 8 Spur Oil Co., May 1961.
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The announcement in the Standard Oil case of "no more auto-
matic filling station sign variances" still stands-a ghost of a
policy that endured less than six months. What the Board said
yesterday does not bind it today.
It seems reasonably clear that almost every one of the sign
variances granted filling stations violated section 24.4222 of the
zoning ordinance. That section reads:
No grant or variance shall be authorized unless the
Board specifically finds that the condition or situation of the
specific piece of property for which a variance is sought is
not of so typical or recurrent a nature as to make reason-
ably practicable the formulation of a general regulation,
as a part of this Ordinance-Resolution for such conditions
or situations. (Emphasis added.)
The minutes of the Board do not show that this specific finding
was made in any of these cases. It is difficult to believe that fill-
ing station signs cannot be regulated by a general regulation.
What is peculiar and unique about the design of Shell, Standard,
Gulf, or Sinclair filling stations?
Denials, apparent inconsistencies, and the shift to non-
enforcement. Between January and August of 1960 the Board
denied eleven requests for sign variances. Four of these were
for filling station signs. One of these four, Standard Oil, was later
reversed. Two of them (for a sign larger than the maximum
size allowable99 and for a locational variance 00) seem indistin-
guishable from the requests for filling station sign variances
granted after September, 1960. It is likewise difficult to distin-
guish pre-September, 1960, cases denying variances for signs
on other businesses from post-September cases granting variances
for such signs. In Application of Robert Feasy01 (pre-September)
a permit was denied although there were other nonconforming
signs in the area, a factor which greatly influenced the Board in
pre- and post-September cases. In Application of Theodore
Elkin 92 (pre-September) a permit was denied for an overhang-
99 Dance Oil Co., May 1960.
100 Joe Fisher, July 1960. Fisher also requested a bulk variance for his
building, which was denied in July 1960, reversed and granted in November 1960.
The minutes of the Board do not show that the denial of the sign variance was
reversed.
101 March 1960.
102 March 1960.
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ing sign in Meadowthorpe shopping center where there were no
nonconforming signs. But in Application of Frisch's Drive-In10
and Application of Sam L. Sexton 4 (both post-September),
there were no nonconforming signs in the Idle Hour and Garden-
side shopping centers in which the respective businesses were
located, and variances were granted.
Only two requests for sign variances were denied after Sep-
tember, 1960. One was probably denied because the business
next door had a conforming sign.10 5 The other was a request by
a liquor store for a sign over the roof line near a residential
district.10 The Board also reversed four pre-September, 1960,
cases denying permits.0 7 In one of them'08 petitioner had at the
time of his second appeal flags and streamers attached to the
building, a neon sign attached flat against the wall of the build-
ing, and a red flashing light on top of the building. He claimed
these were not enough to attract customers, and he wanted to
add a sign above the roof line. On rehearing, the Board granted
permission on condition that he remove the flashing light on top
of the building.
Some observers of the Board have inferred from these cases
that the Board's policy shifted when one membership changed
in September, 1960. This is not verifiable, however, since the
decisions were unanimous except in the few cases where dissents
have been noted in the footnotes. Yet, without some such ex-
planation, it is difficult to reconcile these apparently inconsistent
decisions. Of course consistency may not have been a virtue
sought by the Board. We recognize that these decisions may
simply be the result of an ad hoc approach under which equal
treatment in equal circumstances is of minor importance.
One thing more need be noted about these sign variance
cases, and that is how often petitioners had erected noncon-
forming signs without a permit and had then requested a vari-
ance from the Board of Adjustment. This was true in eleven
103 Denied Dec. 1959, reversed and granted Sept. 1960.
104 March 1961. See also Welgo Traders, denied Oct. 1959, reversed and
granted April 1961 (Gillig dissenting).
105 Joe Isaacs, Jr., Oct. 1960.
.06 Martin Jessee, Oct. 1960, rehearing denied Feb. 1961.
107 Frischs Drive-In, denied Dec. 1959, granted Sept. 1960; Standard Oil
Co., denied May 1960, granted Sept. 1960; Tommy Shuck, denied March 1960,
granted Feb. 1961; Welgo Traders, denied Oct. 1959, granted April 1961.
108 Tommy Shuck, denied March 1960, granted Feb. 1961.
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cases, including one case where a variance for an existing sign
was granted to a member of the Board of Adjustment."9 In only
two of these cases did the Board finally order the offending sign
removed."0 Public realization that sign variances are freely dis-
pensed may lead some persons to erect signs without going
through what appears to them to be a mere formality.
Conclusion. Our conclusion is that, in disposing of these sign
variance cases, the Board has usurped powers of the Planning
Commission and rendered ineffective ordinance provisions regu-
lating signs. We believe the observation of Dennis O'Harrow
about the tendency of boards to usurp legislative authority is
particularly applicable to the Lexington Board of Adjustment's
handling of sign regulations.
You cannot watch zoning activities around the country
for long without concluding that all zoning changes are
now done by pressure .... Probably the weakest link in
the zoning chain is the board of appeals. The board must
be educated to its responsibilities and its powers. It must
not be allowed to usurp legislative authority, which it is
prone to do."'
In the area of sign regulation the Board's decisions reflect
very little concern with the rule of law and the values that eman-
ate therefrom. It is arguable that the rule of law has been re-
placed here by rule by fiat, but more probably it has been largely
replaced by anarchy.
III. SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS
A. Tm LEGAL Nomas
Under the enabling act, a board of adjustment may hear ap-
plications for special exceptions from the zoning ordinance." 2
109 Eight variances were granted on first hearing. One request was at first
denied, then granted as a temporary use. Import Motors, Oct. 1960, and April 1961.
1o Martin Jessee, Oct. 1960, rehearing denied Feb. 1961; Ernest Back, June
1960. Back's sign was still standing in January, 1962, however.
I' O'Harrow, Trends in Planning, Public Management, Nov. 1955, pp. 253-54.
The remarks of a California judge, in setting aside a variance, are also pertinent
here. "If a Board of Zoning Appeals is to be permitted to operate, as it has
in this instance, the quicker the City of Los Angeles 'junks' the entire Compre-
hensive Zoning Plan the better for all concerned as in the long run it will be
but an aching memory." Gaylord, Zoning: Variances, Exceptions and Conditional
Use Permits in California, 5 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 179, 196 (1958), quoting from
Hanson, J., Beloin v. Blankenhorn, No. 560,288, Super. Ct., Los Angeles County(Cal.), 1951.112 Ky. Rev. Stat § 100.470(1)(b) (1960).
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Special exceptions are uses permitted by the zoning ordinance
when specified facts and conditions enumerated in the ordin-
ance are found by the board to exist." 3 The planning theory
underlying provisions for special exceptions is that certain uses,
ordinarily objectionable, may be unobjectionable under certain
circumstances. In determining whether or not the conditions set
forth in the ordinance are met, the board operates as a fact-
finding body. It may grant the special exception if, and only if,
it finds the property owner has met the conditions. It has no
power to alter or waive the conditions." 4
The Lexington ordinance authorizes the Board to grant
special exceptions," 5 and in a summary provision defining special
exceptions it refers by cross reference to all sections wherein
exceptions are provided.:" These exceptions may be divided into
two kinds: (a) those that permit a use in a specified district if
certain conditions are met; (b) those that permit a use in a
specified district "when authorized by the Board of Adjustment."
The first kind is the "true" special exception or conditional use,
which requires the Board to act as a fact-finding body and exer-
cise some limited discretion. The second kind is an absolutely
discretionary exception, which permits the Board to exercise
very broad powers. There are no standards in the ordinance
limiting the discretion of the Board in granting exceptions of
the second kind. The only standard (if it can be called such)
is to be found in the rules of procedure laid down by the Board
itself. It provides: "if the Board finds the use as proposed does
not conflict with the purpose and intent of the ordinance, it
must approve the application."" 7
It is questionable whether the sections in the ordinance
providing for exceptions to be granted in the absolute discre-
tion of the Board are constitutional. Under orthodox consti-
tutional theory, the legislative body of the city cannot delegate
discretionary power unless it supplies safeguards against its arbi-
113 See Kline v. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 325
S.W.2d 324 (Ky. 1959), for explanation of the difference between a variance
and a special exception.
"i4 Abramson v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 143 Conn. 211, 120 A.2d 827 (1956);
Kline v. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 325 S.W.2d
324, 328 (Ky. 1959); 1 Metzenbaum, Law of Zoning 813 (2d ed. 1955).
115 Lexington Zoning Ordinance § 24.41.
316 Lexington Zoning Ordinance § 24.4111.
'17 Board of Adjustment Rules, p. 2.
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trary exercise. This requirement is usually satisfied by providing
a reasonably definite standard to guide its exercise. None is ex-
pressly provided in the ordinance. The Court of Appeals has in
numerous cases held unconstitutional similar land use control
regulations where no reasonably definite standard was provided
to guide discretion." s Even if it is inferred that the first section
of the ordinance, which provides the ordinance is "for the purpose
of promoting the public health, safety, morals or the general
welfare," sets forth a standard applicable to the granting of special
exceptions, it would not be a sufficiently definite standard under
prior Kentucky cases." 9 Indeed, in 1961 the Court of Appeals
struck down a Covington ordinance which gave the Board of
Commissioners authority to license a trailer park when it would
not "jeopardize the public health, safety, morals and welfare of
the inhabitants of the City of Covington, . . . [taking] into con-
sideration the topography and density of the population of the
location applicable in the particular case." 12o Appellant argued
that although the first clause by itself perhaps did not prescribe
a sufficiently definite standard, the addition of the factors of
topography and density made it definite. Said the court:
However, in our opinion the mere direction that the board
of commissioners shall 'take into consideration' these fac-
tors supplies no actual standard at all, and adds nothing
to the general direction that the board shall determine what
effect the granting of the license would have on public
health, safety, morals and welfare, because the latter direc-
tion necessarily contemplates that the board will consider
118 See, e.g., Bowman v. Board of Councilmen, 303 Ky. 1, 196 S.W.2d 730
(1946); Town of Jamestown v. Allen, 284 Ky. 347, 144 S.W.2d 807 (1940) (im-
plied standard of "against public morals, health, safety or public policy" not
sufficient); Town of Bloomfield v. Bayne, 206 Ky. 68, 266 S.W. 885 (1924).
119 Cf. Board of Adjustment v. Dixie Suburban Volunteer Fire Dep't., 320
S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1959), where circuit court held invalid a power to grant special
exceptions "when found to be in the interest of the-public health, safety, morals
or general welfare of the community." The Court of Appeals reversed, holding
the constitutional question was improperly raised and refusing to pass on it. But
see Schmidt v. Craig, 345 S.W.2d 292 (Ky. 1962); Thomson v. Tafel, 309 Ky.
758, 218 S.W.2d 977 (1949) (affirming grants of discretionary special exceptions;
constitutionality not argued); cf. Kline v. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of
Zoning Adjustment, 325 S.W.2d 324 (Ky. 1959). A recent case indicates the court
is shifting from the "reasonably definite standard" test to a "reasonable safeguards
in the context" test, in judging the constitutionality of delegation of power to state
administrative agencies. Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of No. Ky., Inc., 352
S.W.2d 203 (Ky. 1961). Whether the court will apply the same test to delegation
to local boards remains to be seen.120 Schneider v. Wink, 350 S.W.2d 504 (Ky. 1961).
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all factors that bear upon health, safety, morals and wel-
fare. The ordinance does not suggest what weight shall
be given to the factors of topography and density of pop-
ulation, or what features of topography or what extent of
density of population shall be significant.' 12
If a standard which prescribes two unweighted factors in addi-
tion to general welfare is not sufficiently definite, it would seem
that a power measured by a standard prescribing no factors (as
is the case of the Lexington zoning ordinance's absolutely dis-
cretionary exceptions) is void, unless the court finds other ade-
quate safeguards are built in the board of adjustment system.
If the power to grant absolutely discretionary exceptions is
unconstitutional because it vests arbitrary power in the Board,
the effect may be either to invalidate the requirement of Board
approval (thus permitting the use) or to invalidate the entire
section providing for the special exception (thus prohibiting
the use until valid standards are prescribed). Cases in other
jurisdictions are in conflict on this question, but the latter solu-
tion is clearly preferable from the viewpoint of sound planning
theory.
B. THE CASES BEFOPE = BOA
Between January, 1960, and June, 1961, the Board passed
upon sixteen cases wherein the applicant requested a special
exception. In one of these cases the applicant requested two
special exceptions; hence the total number of requests was seven-
teen. Of these seventeen requests, the Board denied two, both
of which were filed by the same applicant.
1. Conditional exceptions.
Only two of the requests were for "true" special exceptions,
where the required conditions to be met by the applicant were
set forth in the ordinance. In both cases the Board granted the
exceptions, even though neither applicant met the specific con-
ditions required by the ordinance. In one case2 2 the petitioner
wished to build a bowling alley in a neighborhood business dis-
trict. Under the ordinance a bowling alley is permitted in this
district as a special exception only when it is located on a lot
121 Id. at 505.
122 Charlie Cottrell, May 1961.
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abutting a state or federal highway.1' The particular land in
question was not located on either type of highway. Nonetheless,
the Board granted the request. The apparent reason for this
decision was the color of the prospective bowlers. Negroes are
usually denied admission to other bowling alleys in Lexington,
and this one was to be built for Negroes in a Negro section of
town. However much sympathy one may feel for the Negroes,
it is questionable procedure for the Board of Adjustment to at-
tempt to remedy racial inequalities by allowing "separate but
equal" bowling facilities that violate requirements of the ordin-
ance. A more basic criticism of this case, however, is that under
the law the Board is not authorized to ignore, or to consider the
merits of, the ordinance requirements that a bowling alley must
be located on a state or federal highway. 24 No proof of unneces-
sary hardship, required for a variance, was offered in the case.
In the second case 2" the petitioner wanted to build a motel
in an agricultural district. A motel is permitted in such a district
as a special exception only if the "entire tract shall be within 500
feet of a B-3 district." 6 This is an anti-sprawl provision, requir-
ing motels to be built adjacent to developed areas. The edge of
the tract on which the motel was to be built was some 8,200
feet from the nearest B-3 district. The Board apparently decided
it could not ignore the 500 feet requirement of the ordinance.
Instead it granted a variance, upon the following claim of un-
necessary hardship:
A variance should be granted ... because the construction
of this motel will promote the prosperity of the community,
will conserve land values in this area and will protect the
usefulness of urban land. It will further relieve the peti-
tioners from the practical difficulty and unnecessary hard-
ship of having a very expensive piece of property on their
hands and it being zoned only for agricultural uses.
This statement of "hardship" is really a statement of reasons for
a zone change. The proper action would have been to refer the
petitioner to the Planning Commission.
123 Lexington Zoning Ordinance § 12.171.
124 See Kline v. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 325
S.W.2d 324 (Ky. 1959); Sims v. Bradley, 309 Ky. 626, 218 S.W.2d 641 (1949).
125 Stidham Brothers, Jan. 1961.
126 Lexington Zoning Ordinance § 6.291.
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2. Discretionary exceptions.
Fifteen of the seventeen requests were for absolutely dis-
cretionary exceptions-uses permitted "when authorized by the
Board of Adjustment." Thirteen were granted; two were denied.
Seven of these requests were for office buildings in an R-4
(apartment) district. The ordinance requires a certain number
of parking spaces for every office building located in a residential
district. 27 Three of the six applicants complied with the park-
ing requirements, and their requests were granted. Two did not
comply, but their requests likewise were granted. The other two
requests were from the same applicant, who wished to construct
two medical office buildings adjacent to a new medical clinic
in an R-4 district which he had built under a special exception
granted in 1957.128 He met the parking requirements of the or-
dinance. Nonetheless, his requests were "denied on the basis that
the intent of the 1957 decision.., was that the office uses would
be confined to the main building and would not scatter to the
fringes of the ... property."1 29
Other requests included two for rest homes in R-3 and R-4
districts, three for nursery schools in R-1 districts, two for park-
ing lots in 1-8 districts (the only two where there were any
protestants), and two for businesses in residential districts. All
these requests were granted.
Some of the petitioners in these cases appealed to the Board
under section 24.422 of the ordinance, which is the section author-
izing the Board to grant variances. We have classified the cases
as special exceptions, however, for two reasons. First, no evi-
dence of hardship, which is required for a variance, was intro-
duced. Evidence of hardship is not required for a special ex-
ception. Second, inasmuch as the requests could not have been
properly granted as variances but could have been granted as
special exceptions, we believe it is only fair to the Board to
assume they were granted as special exceptions. Since our pur-
127 Lexington Zoning Ordinance § 19.2. Section 19.23 authorizes the Board
to waive parking requirements for office buildings located in business or industrial
districts, but there is no express authority for waiving such requirements in a resi-
dential district.128 George Young, Inc., Feb. 1960.
129 Minutes of the Board of Adjustment, Feb. 1960, pp. 8-9.
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pose is to appraise the Board's actions, we have resolved -any
doubts in favor of the Board.
On the basis of the disposition of these cases it is not possible
to say whether the Board acted wisely or unwisely, fairly -or un-
fairly, or whether a sound or unsound planning theory underlay
the Board's actions. The minutes of the Board are sketchy, and
no written opinions are fied. Without any policies, standards,
or rules to guide the Board's decisions, and without any require-
ment that the Board justify its actions by an opinion, the possi-
bilities of arbitrary use of power are great. But there is no proof
here that they have been realized or not realized. We are simply
in the dark.
Because the Board turned down only one petitioner it may
be contended that any possible complaint about lack of due
process is de minimis. Yet not only the petitioners but also the
public in whose behalf regulation is undertaken have a right to
expect, as part of the basic administrative process, that discre-
tionary exceptions will be decided by something more than the
individual preferences of Board members and with regard to the
public interest. There is no machinery in the ordinance-or in the
Board's procedure for furthering the realization of that expecta-
tion, or for measuring it.
C. TEmPoARY. .Pmurrs
One minor power which the Board has under the ordinance
is the power to grant temporary permits for uses that do not con-
form to the ordinance. These are in the nature of special excep-
tions for uses "of a true temporary nature" which do "not in-
volve the erection of substantial buildings."' 30 The temporary
permit may be granted for not more than twelve months.
130 Lexington Zoning Ordinance § 24.111:
In addition to permitting the special exceptions heretofore specified in
this Ordinance-Resolution ... . the Board shall have authority to permit
the following:
24.4112 Temporary Uses and Permits
24.41121 The temporary use of a building or premises in any district
for a purpose or use that does not conf6im to the regulations 'preicribed by
this Ordinance-Resolution; provided, that such 'use be of a true temp6rary
nature and does not involve the erection of substantial buildings. Such
permit shall be granted in the form of a temporary and revocable permit
For not more than a twelve (12) month period, subject to such conditions
as will safeguard the public health, safety, convenience and general welfare.
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The Board had six requests for temporary permits. Of these
the Board granted five. Two were for uses of an unquestion-
ably "true temporary nature": for use of an R-1 lot as a temporary
storage ground for highway equipment while the state repaired,
the road, and for parking a trailer in a neighborhood business
district. Both were granted. Temporary permits were also grant-
ed for a "trampoline center" in a highway service district, and
to a church for use of a house within twenty feet of a residential
lot as a church until a new church was built.1
3 1
The other two temporary permit cases involved structures
that had been built in violation of the zoning ordinance. In
one, Import Motors had erected a canopy in violation of bulk
requirements. In October, 1960, the Board denied a variance
and ordered the canopy torn down. Six months later the Board
temporarily reversed itself and issued a temporary permit for
the canopy and also for a free standing sign.'3 2 Whether a canopy
and a free standing sign are "of a true temporary nature" is
questionable. The Board may be tempted to use the temporary
use permit when it properly cannot grant a variance.
The second case involved a single-family structure which
the owner, without a proper permit, had converted into multiple-
family use in a one-family residential district. 33 The owner
sought a temporary permit until the Planning Commission could
rule upon her application for a zone change. Twenty-two protest-
ants appeared. The Board denied the permit.
IV. INTERPRETATION
Questions sometimes arise as to the correct interpretation of
the zoning ordinance. By the enabling act' 34 and the Lexington
zoning ordinance' 5 the Board of Adjustment is authorized to hear
appeals from the building inspector's decisions interpreting the
correct boundary lines of the zoning map and the words of the
ordinance. The cases requiring the Board to interpret the ordi-
'3' Lexington Zoning Ordinance § 7.12 permits churches in residential dis-
tricts when "located not less than 20 feet from any other lot in any residence
district."
132 Import Motors, variance denied Oct. 1960, temporary permit granted
April 1961 (Thompson and Gillig dissenting).
S3 Angelee Bryant, Dec. 1960.
'
3 4 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 100.450 (1960).
135 Lexington Zoning Ordinance §§ 4.23, 24.41, 24.421.
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nance can be divided into three categories: home occupations,
nonconforming uses, and miscellaneous.
A. Homvm OCCUPATIONS
The Lexington zoning ordinance provides that the Board may
authorize any "customary incidental home occupations when
conducted within a dwelling and not in any accessory build-
ing."-"6 As readily can be seen the Board's power here is one of
interpretation: What are home occupations customarily inci-
dental to the use of the premises as a residence? In determining
what is a "customary incidental home occupation," several fac-
tors control. First, it must be an incidental, not a primary, use
of the property. Second, it must be customary-a variable con-
cept conveying the idea that it is an occupation you would
expect to find in the home in this particular community at this
particular time. Third, the occupation must be engaged in by
a person who is a resident in the house. Fourth, any conse-
quential traffic, noise, or odor must not seriously damage the
residential values of the neighborhood. And, fifth, the ordinance
prohibits the sale of any goods except such as are made on the
premises.
It is not altogether easy to decide in specific cases whether
a proposed use is a customary incidental home occupation.
During the seventeen months of our study the Board was re-
quired to make this determination in twenty-seven cases in-
volving twenty-eight requests. Twenty-four of these requests
for home occupations were granted; four were denied.
The applications granted requested permission for various
types of home occupations: fourteen beauty shops, three repair
1 3 6 Lexington Zoning Ordinance § 8.24. The entire section reads:
Accessory Uses Permitted When Authorized by the Board of Adjustment.
Customary incidental home occupations when conducted within a dwelling
and not in any accessory building; providd, that no stock in trade is kept
or commodities sold except such as are made on the premises, that not
more than one person not a resident on the premises is employed, and that
not more than one-fourth of the floor area of one story of the dwelling is
devoted to such home occupation; provided further, that such occupation
shall not require internal or external alteration, or involve construction
features or use of mechanical equipment not customary in dwellings, and
that the entrance to the space devoted to such occupation shall be from
within the dwelling. One sign, containing the name and occupation only,
not over one and one-half square feet in area and attached flat against the
main building shall be permitted, at the discretion of the Board, in connec-
tion with such home occupation.
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shops; two real estate offices, an accountant's office, an antique
shop, a printing shop, a shop for fabricating rubber stamps, a
business telephone for a washing machine repairman who did
none of his work at home, and a permit for "breeding and mer-
chandising tropical fish."
Operation of a beauty shop was the home occupation most
sought after. The Board granted all such requests, except one
where a beauty shop was forbidden by a deed restriction. While
a beauty shop may perhaps reasonably be classified as a customary
home occupation (the cases are conflicting), the Board's action
is subject to criticism on another ground. The Fayette County
Board of Health, in a letter to the Board,137 strongly opposed any
further permits for beauty shops in houses not connected to a
public sewer. The increase in septic tank sewerage during the last
few years has created a serious danger to public health in the
Lexington metropolitan area. Nonetheless, after receipt of this
letter, the Board granted three requests for beauty shops in houses
that were not on a public sewer. In most of these cases there were
strong protests from the neighbors, but to no avail.
Courts have generally excluded real estate offices' 38 and public
accountants' offices 3 9 from the classification of home occupations.
If these are objectionable, it. would seem that electrical and
television repair shops and printing shops are even more ob-
jectionable. Yet the Board classified all of these as customary
home occupations.
Of the twenty-four permits granted, ten were granted with
conditions imposed by the Board. These conditions varied, but
one which was present in all ten cases was that no one who was
not a resident of the house could be employed there. In two
cases, to cure the objection of the planning staff that there was
inadequate parking space, the Board limited the number of cus-
tomers allowed in the house at one time. In four cases, the
Board limited the hours the business could remain open. And
in two cases, the permits were granted subject to revocation
if. the operation interfered with neighborhood television or radio
reception or the peace of the neighborhood. The building in-
137 Minutes of the Board of Adjustment, Feb. 1961, p. 68.
138 E.g., Village of Riverside v. Kuhne, 835 Ill. App. 547, 82 N.E.2d 500
(1948).
139 E.g., Kort v. Los Angeles, 52 Cal. App. 2d 804, 127 P.2d 66 (1942).
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spector's office said it would be difficult to enforce most of these
conditions, but the Board was satisfied that the neighbors would
complain if the conditions were broken. It may be asked, how-
ever, whether old neighbors will remember, and new neighbors
know of, these conditions and whether setting neighbor against
neighbor is really a satisfactory method of enforcement.
Denials. Four home occupation requests were denied. Two of
them were denied, however, not on the ground that the pro-
posed use was not a customary incidental home occupation,
but on the ground that private restrictive covenants entered into
evidence by protesting neighbors prohibited the use and there-
fore it would be useless for the Board to grant the request. The
Board apparently has adopted a policy of not granting a permit
for a home occupation where protestants introduce into evi-
dence a deed restriction prohibiting it.140 This policy appears
unsound for two reasons. First, it is the function of a court, not
the function of a board of adjustment, to decide whether the
neighbors can enforce a private deed restriction. Enforcement
turns upon some rather tricky legal doctrines of which the lay
members of the board can have no understanding. In the
Application of Virginia Morris,"4 for instance, the deed was am-
biguous. And petitioner's attorney argued that the deed could
not be construed as excluding a beauty shop. Construction of
deeds is a legal question, for which a lay board has no special
competence. By deciding this question of construction and there-
upon denying the permit, the Board seriously jeopardized peti-
tioner's chances of getting a judicial determination of the matter.
The Board should leave private law questions to the courts.141a
Second, it is the function of the Board to interpret the ordinance
according to common sense and sound planning concepts, taking
into consideration the factors mentioned at the beginning of
this subsection. A deed restriction may be relevant to the ques-
tion of interpretation' only in a very limited way: many deeds
containing private restrictions against, for instance, beauty shops
140 In one case, however, where the deed restriction was entered into evi-
dence by the planning staff and there were no protestants, the Board granted the
application. James Barnett, Jan. 1960.
141 May 1961.
141a-Cf. Perry v. County Bd. of Appeals for Montgomery County, 211 Md.
294, 127 A.2d 507 (1956); Chayt v. Maryland Jockey Club, 179 Md. 890,- 18
A.2d 856 (1941).
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may be some evidence of what property owners regard as not
a customary incidental home occupation. But one restriction is
no evidence of the public mind. In any case, even if it could
be proved conclusively by deed restrictions what the public
thinks a customary home occupation is, this would not justify
the Board's policy of turning to the public mind only when
there is a deed restriction on the lot involved. If the public mind
is to control the question of interpretation of the ordinance, it
should control it regardless of whether there are restrictions on
the particular lot in question.
The two requests denied as not being for customary home oc-
cupations were for a barber shop 142 and a business telephone.143
The exclusion of a barber shop as a home occupation accords
with general practice elsewhere. The telephone case presented
an unusual problem in defining home occupation. The peti-
tioner, a used car salesman, wished to install a business telephone.
He stated in his petition that no stock in trade would be kept
or sold on the premises. Where the used cars would be kept
he did not say. Seventeen neighboring property owners ob-
jected on the ground that he planned to use his front lawn as a
used car lot, as they alleged he had done in the past. Petitioner
denied that such was his intention, but he introduced no evi-
dence of where the cars would be kept. The Board denied his
request.
Conclusion. We came to the conclusion that the Board classi-
fied as a home occupation almost any occupation that can be per-
formed in, and might occasionally be found in, a home. These
home occupation permits were granted in the newer subdivisions
as well as in the older areas. What effect they will have on the
residential values sought in those areas remains to be seen.
B. NONCONFomRMNG USES
In discussing variances and special exceptions we have used
the term "nonconforming use" to refer to any use of land that
does not conform with the requirements of the ordinance,
whether the nonconformity began before or after the date the
142 Morgan and Morgan, May 1961. Accord, Gold v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust-
ment, 398 Pa. 401, 148 A.2d 59 (1958).
143 A. C. Chandler, April 1961.
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ordinance was adopted. This is in accord with the usage of the
Board, which regards any nonconformity in the neighborhood
as an important factor in determining whether to grant variances
and exceptions. Here we deal with nonconforming uses in the
technical sense: nonconforming uses that antedate the zoning
ordinance. And the term "nonconforming uses" is used in this
subsection only in this technical sense. Such nonconforming
uses have been protected by the law on the theory that it
would be unwise, and perhaps unfair, for the ordinance to have
retroactive effect. If it did have retroactive effect, a developer
would not be likely to risk his capital, which could be wiped out
by an amendment at any time.
Under the enabling act any nonconforming "use of land...
may be continued, and a nonconforming use of the building or
structure may be changed to another nonconforming use of the
same or more restricted classification."144 The Lexington zoning
ordinance, in accordance with the statute, allows a use of a non-
conforming building or structure to "be changed to a use per-
mitted in the most restricted district in which such nonconform-
ing use is permitted." 45 But the ordinance, contrary to the
statute, also provides that "any nonconforming use of land not
involving any structure" and "any nonconforming sign, bill-
board and other similar structure valued at $750.00 or less"
within the city must cease or be removed within two years after
the enactment of the ordinance.14 These provisions, being con-
trary to the enabling act, are undoubtedly void.
Two other sections of the Lexington ordinance respecting
nonconforming uses are of dubious validity. One provides that
any nonconforming building destroyed or damaged by fire, flood,
or act of God more than sixty-five percent of its fair market
value may not be reconstructed.147 This section appears to be in
conflict with Butler v. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of
Zoning Adjustment & Appeals.148 In this case the Court of Appeals
144 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 100.355 (1960), added by Ky. Acts 1952, ch. 118.
145 Lexington Zoning Ordinance § 5.221.
146 Lexington Zoning Ordinance § 5.21.
147 Lexington Zoning Ordinance § 5.223.
148 311 Ky. 663, 224 S.W.2d 658 (1949). The enabling act for first class
cities was amended in 1948 to repeal provisions authorizing amortization of non-
conforming uses and prohibition of structural alterations or additions to non-
(Footnote continued on next page)
1962]
KENTucKy LAw JouNAL[
held that because the enabling act permitted the continued non-
conforming use of "land" as well as the continued use of "build-
ings," the land owner could demolish the existing structure and
construct a new, larger building for carrying on his business.
If the landowner can by his own action demolish and rebuild,
a fortiori he can rebuild when his building is damaged by fire,
flood, or act of God.140 The other doubtful section of the ordin-
ance provides that no building containing a nonconforming use
shall be extended.150 This too appears to be invalid under the
Butler case, which held that a nonconforming "use of land" may
expand within the boundaries of the original tract devoted to
the nonconforming use. These sections of the ordinance were
enacted prior to the 1952 amendment to the enabling act which
allowed nonconforming uses of land to continue. Before 1952
the enabling act contained no provisions respecting nonconform-
ing uses. These sections of the ordinance probably are now in-
valid, but they have never been repealed.
The Board of Adjustment was requested to grant building
permits in two cases to petitioners who wished to alter or en-
large their nonconforming uses. In one the request was to re-
place an old sign on a nonconforming restaurant with a new
sign.'5' The Board granted the request, which action appears
to be required by Butler. In the other case, the petitioner wanted
to connect two adjacent houses, both of which were being used
as nonconforming tourist homes called jointly the "Yokum
Motel."52 The Board denied the request. This decision was
contrary to Butler, which held a nonconforming use could be
enlarged under the terms of the enabling act, and on appeal the
Board's decision was reversed by the local circuit court. 5 3 The
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
conforming uses. Ky. Acts 1948, ch. 104. The enabling act provisions permitting
continuance of nonconforming uses of land and buildings in first class cities were
extended to second class cities in 1952. Ky. Acts 1952, ch. 118. In 1962 an attempt
was made in S.B. 224 to authorize amortization of nonconforming uses, but the
provision was deleted from the bill before it passed the General Assembly. For a
critical analysis of Kentucky law respecting nonconforming uses, see Note, 49 Ky.
L.J. 142 (1960).
149 Cf. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Stoker,
259 S.W.2d 443 (Ky. 1953).150 Lexington Zoning Ordinance § 5.225.
151 James W. Lucas, July 1960.
152 Nancy Yokum Wynn, April 1961.
'53 Wynn v. Thompson, Civil No. 9677, Fayette Cir. Ct. (Ky.), May 31, 1961.
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Board cannot be fairly criticized for its decision in the Yokum
Motel case, however, since it was applying section 5.225 of the
ordinance as written. The Board has no power to consider
whether the ordinance is valid. This section had never been
expressly declared invalid by a court although it was inferenti-
ally invalid under the principle of the Butler case.
In one case the Board was called upon to determine whether
a nonconforming use ran with the land. Petitioner desired to
continue a nonconforming rest home which the present operator,
because of ill health, was unable to continue.154 In accordance
with the legal principle that a nonconforming use runs with the
land, 55 the Board granted the request.
In the last case involving a nonconforming use, the question
was whether the petitioner had lost his right to a nonconform-
ing use by abandonment. 5 ' This is a fact question, requiring,
inter alia, a determination of intent to abandon. 57 The Board
found petitioner did not intend to abandon his business use even
though he had rented part of his empty grocery store for several
years to the Newman Club.58 The decision of the Board was
supported by substantial evidence, and on appeal it was affirm-
ed by circuit court. 59 (The minutes of the Board indicate that
one member was influenced by the claim that petitioner, if he
lost, would be "at the mercy of the University of Kentucky."160
The University was threatening to, and did thereafter, con-
demn the petitioner's land for a parking lot. The result of the
Board's decision was that the University had to pay a slightly
higher price for the lot).
C. MIscELANEous
In eight cases the Board was asked to interpret miscellane-
ous provisions in the ordinance. In the first case'6 ' the question
was what constituted a "trucking terminal' which is expressly
'54 Mary Hensley, April 1960.
155 2 Rathkopf & Rathkopf, op. cit. supra note 24, at 58-8.
156 Lexington Zoning Ordinance § 5.222 provides that the right to a non-
conforming use is lost if it is "voluntarily discontinued" for two years.
'57 City of Bowling Green v. Miller, 335 S.W.2d 893 (Ky. 1960).
15s S. C. Guilfoyle, Feb. 1960 (Thompson dissenting).
159 Commonwealth v. Johnson, Civil No. 8171, Fayette Cir. Ct. (Ky.), April
21, 1960.
160 Minutes of the Board of Adjustment, Feb. 1960, p. 10.10 Malvern Bell, April 1960.
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prohibited in a general business (B-4) district.' The peti-
tioner operated Red Arrow Delivery, a delivery service firm
which picks up packages at local stores, takes them to its "term-
inal" for separation, then delivers them to private homes. The
trucks used in the business are not tractor-trailer trucks, but are
usually panel trucks. The Board decided a "trucking terminal"
did not include a Red Arrow terminal, on the theory that it was
not the kind of "trucking terminal" intended to be prohibited
in a B-4 district. Accordingly, it granted the permit.
In the second case 163 the question was whether the Fugazzi
Business College was a "school or college for academic instruc-
tion," which is permitted in any residential district. 6 4 The Board
held it was.' 65 The Fugazzi Business College is a private profit-
making institution which offers day and night courses in typing,
shorthand, bookkeeping, the use of business machines, business
law, and business English. It occupies one building and has
no dormitories. It is, in short, a secretarial school. Similar schools
can be found in most cities. Had the ordinance permitted any
"school" in a residential district, the Fugazzi operation prob-
ably would have qualified. The proper test is whether the so-
called school is consistent with the residential uses in the area,
bearing in mind the purpose of the ordinance in allowing schools
in residential areas despite the inconveniences of noise and
traffic to the neighborhood. But here the ordinance expressly lim-
ited permissible schools to those "for academic instruction." The
question, then, is whether or not a profit-making organization
teaching white-collar skills is a "school for academic instruction."
The word "academic" implies a curriculum of science, liberal
arts, or professional knowledge as distinguished from mere skill.
On the other hand, the courses taught at the Fugazzi Business
College are part of the curriculum of many admittedly academic
162 Lexington Zoning Ordinance §§ 15.41, 18.4.
163 Fugazzi Business College, Sept. 1960.
164 Lexington Zoning Ordinance § 7.15.
165A letter to the Board, signed by Virgil F. Young, president of Fugazzi
Business College, is a masterpiece of words-of-one-syllable and should not be lost
to posterity. It reads:
It is true that a business college is not normally thought of as an academic
college. Neither is a business college a vocational school. It is more academic
in nature than vocational since its subjects are economic in nature plus the
learning of office skills. We believe then that whether our type school is
academic is in fact an academic issue itself and for that reason we believe
permission to build should be granted.
[Vol. 50,
ZONING BOABD OF ADjUSTmENT
schools, including the College of Commerce of the University
of Kentucky. However, reference to only part of the curriculum of
an academic institution cannot be a proper test, else so-called
schools for carpentry, tinsmithing, nursing, dancing, and music
(courses offered in many high schools and colleges) qualify.
The proper test appears to be whether the curriculum of the
secretarial school is similar to the primary curriculum of an
academic institution, not to some incidental part. Even under
this test, however, it is sometimes-as in this case-difficult to
determine what is a "school for academic instruction." In view
of the mixed uses in the area in which Fugazzi wanted to locate,
the Board's determination that it was "a school for academic
instruction" seems not unreasonable.
166
In the third case 167 the Board was asked to interpret distance
requirements. The petitioner wanted to open a bar in a B-1
district, which is permitted if the "drinking establishment" is
"located not less than 100 feet from any Residence district."68
The barroom itself was to be some 175 feet from a residential
district, but it was to be located in a building which was within
100 feet. The Board decided that 100 feet were required be-
tween the barroom and the residential district, not between the
outer walls of the building in which the barroom was located
and the district. Therefore it granted the petition.
In the fourth case 6 9 there was a dispute over the location
of the zoning district line on the zoning map. Petitioner claimed
his lot was in a business rather than a residential district. The
Board agreed.'7
166 Strother Kiser, Fugazzi's attorney of record, was a member of the Board,
having been appointed one day before the Board ruled on the case. The min-
utes state he disqualified himself from "acting" in the case.
167 Chakers Theaters, April 1961.
168 Lexington Zoning Ordinance § 12.17.
169 Charles Cossett, Sept. 1960.
170 Strother Kiser, Cossett's attorney of record, was appointed to the Board
the day before the Boaid ruled on the case. The minutes read:
Mr. Kiser disqualified himself from acting in this case because he is attorney
for the appellant on this appeal. Mr. Kiser told the Board that Mr. Cossett
had previously proposed to locate a liquor store on this site but that he
has entered into a contract to sell the liquor license and that a liquor store
will not be located on the property.... [Protestants then asked that a re-
striction be put in the deedprohibiting a liquor store.] Mr. Kiser said that
his client would not agree to such a deed restriction.
Minutes of the Board of Adjustment, Sept. 1960, p. 43. Under Canon 31, of
the American Bar Associations Canons of Judicial Ethics it is improper for a
(Footnote continued on next page)
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The other four miscellaneous cases involved questions of
whether or not a miniature golf course was of the same general
character as the uses permitted in a neighborhood business dis-
trict:' and whether or not Go-Kart tracks were of the same gen-
eral character as the uses permitted in general business and
industrial districts.' 2 In each instance the Board answered the
questions affirmatively.
The decisions in these miscellaneous interpretation cases
were all within the realm of reasonableness and within the limits
of the Board's discretion.
V. STATISTICAL SUMMARY
We present here a table showing the number of petitions
granted and denied, classified by type of case. These figures are
not very significant by themselves. They do show that a high
percentage of the petitions were granted, but if all these peti-
tions were properly granted there can be no valid criticism of
the Board on the ground that the percentage is high. In the
nonconforming use cases, for instance, the Board granted three
out of four petitions. But the law required granting all the peti-
tions; the one petition denied was reversed by circuit court. The
fundamental question is whether or not the Board acted on each
petition in accordance with law, and without substantial injury to
the neighborhood and community values, not whether it granted
"too many" or "too few" petitions.
Although the data available for comparison are limited, the
percentage of variance petitions granted by the Lexington
Board (75%) seems generally in line with the percentage grant-
ed by boards elsewhere. In Los Angeles during 1960, 68% of
the use variance, and 76% of the bulk variance, applications
were granted. 3 In Cambridge, Massachusetts, during 1952, 84%o
of the use variance, and 86% of the bulk variance, applications
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
judge to appear as an attorney in a court in which he is judge. This standard
is equally applicable in principle to members of administrative boards. Cf. Sims v.
Bradley, 309 Ky. 626, 218 S.W.2d 641 (1949); Rathkopf & Rathkopf, op. cit. supra
note 24, at 22-5 to -12.
171 James Music, April 1961.
172 M.A.C. Corporation, May 1961; D.L.S. Amusement Co., April 1961;
Roy L. Gower, April 1960.
173 Los Angeles City Planning Commission, 1960 Accomplishments 48 (1961).
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No. of Granted Denied Percentage Percentage
Type of case petitions granted denied
Use variance .................... 120 3 7 30% 70%
Bulk variance
Other than signs .......... 51 44 7 86% 14%
Signs ............................ 41 29 12 71% 29%
Special exception ............ 17 15 2 88% 12%
Temporary use ................ 6 5 1 83% 17%
Home occupation ............ 28 24 4 86% 14%
Nonconforming use ........ 4 3 1 75% 25%
Miscellaneous ................. 8 8 0 100% -
TOTAL ............................ 1670 131 34 79% 21%
Planning staff
recommendations ........ 15900 69 90 43% 57%
- This figure includes one petition that has not yet been finally disposed of and one
petition that was granted as a use variance although the use was permitted as a special
exception in the district. Neither of these cases is reported as "granted" or "denied."
Both are excluded in computing percentages.
* The planning staff made no recommendation in eight cases.
were granted.'7 4 In Austin, Texas, during 1946, 67% of all vari-
ance applications were granted, while in Milwaukee during
that same year 74% were granted.7 5 During the period 1926-37,
77% of all variance applications were granted in Cincinnati.176
Since the various applications from city to city are likely to
involve similar patterns of facts, these statistics may be some evi-
dence that the factors which move the Lexington Board to grant
variances and exceptions move boards elsewhere.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In order to evaluate the operations of the Board of Adjust-
ment it is necessary to keep in mind what the function of a
board of adjustment is supposed to be under our present Euci-
dean zoning system. The board was originally conceived as a
device to avoid constitutional problems which might be raised
when broad, general regulations imposed an unusually severe
hardship upon an individual landowner because of the unique-
ness of his lot. The board was not instituted to achieve flex-
ibility. Variances were not to be granted merely because the
proposed use did not involve a substantial departure from the
comprehensive plan nor injuriously affect the adjoining land.
'74Haar, Land-Use Planning 296 (1959).175 Administration of Zoning Variances in 20 Cities, 30 Pub. Management
70 (1948).17GAmerican Society of Planning Officials, Zoning Changes and Variances,
Bull. No. 43, p. 3 (April 1938).
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Unnecessary hardship, not insubstantial harm, is theoretically
the touchstone of the board's jurisdiction.
According to traditional zoning theory, a board of adjust-
ment, unlike a planning commission, does not make broad plan-
ning policy. It makes policy only interstitially, as courts make
policy, by deciding individual cases within a framework of laws
and regulations constructed by others. Operating in a quasi-
judicial capacity, the board is not at large to decide cases by its
own notions of desirable land use or its personal preferences
respecting land use policies. This is in no way gainsaid by the
fact that the members of a board are not necessarily law-condi-
tioned and therefore are not expected to apply the strict rules
of evidence and procedure a court applies. They are expected
to rcognize the limitations on their powers set forth in the
zoning ordinance and in the enabling act, and to develop and
apply techniques and safeguards which will tend to assure citizens
equal protection of the law. Otherwise, a board, no less than
a court, will lose the confidence of the public. And the demo-
cratic process, which is based on rule by law and not by caprice,
is endangered.
The problem we have been studying is how well the Lex-
ington Board of Adjustment has filfilled its function. Our gen-
eral conclusion is that the Board has not operated in such a
manner as to assure citizens equal protection of the law. It
has not, during the seventeen months of our study, produced a
pattern of consistent, sound, and articulate judgments. Nor have
its operations assured the public that the comprehensive plan is
not being thwarted through the variance device. We do not mean
by this to imply any personal criticism of the individual mem-
bers of the Board. To the best of our knowledge they are all
honest men and good citizens, serving without pay in a thank-
less job. Our criticism goes to the institution, which we find is
functioning badly. We herein seek to indicate why.
A. Tim IssuEs BEFORE Tim BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT ARE NOT MADE
CLEAR By THE PETrrIONERS OR By =H BoARD
The issues involved in the cases before the Board (Is the
property unique? Is this a self-created hardship? Can the prob-
lem be handled by general regulations? Etc.) are not made clear
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by the parties or by the Board. Petitioners often are not rep-
resented by counsel and have no idea what the limits of the
Board's power are or what legal standards are applicable to the
case. They sometimes assume the Board sits like a Turkish
cadi dispensing justice out of an unwritten Koran. It is not too
much to say that some lawyers appearing before the Board also
are unfamiliar with zoning law, which has developed so rapidly
over the last thirty years. The form letter of appeal, given
petitioners by the building inspector, does not indicate what
legal grounds there are for hardship and what evidence they
will be expected to produce. As a result of their lack of under-
standing of the law, petitioners come ill-prepared to focus on
an issue and often do not realize they have a burden of proof.
This, coupled with informality of procedure, can lead to meander-
ing discussion, confusion, misunderstanding, and public dis-
satisfaction. 77
One of the techniques evolved by courts for steadying dis-
cussion is to draw the issues sharply. This brings a focus to dis-
cussion and a realization by the parties of the precise problem.
No matter which way the court decides the issue, the parties have
the satisfaction of knowing they have had a chance to con-
vince the court on the issue it regards as controlling. And be-
cause the issue is drawn carefully, the decision can serve use-
fully as a precedent.
Doubtless a board of laymen cannot draw an issue as sharply
as a law-trained judge. But under present Board procedure
issues are frequently not drawn at all, and seldom in advance.
Most petitioners filed petitions which showed no more recog-
nition of the legal issues involved than is shown by the follow-
ing statement, which was commonly inserted as a reason for
hardship: "This property is well-suited for the purpose for which
177 For some shortcomings of procedure, see Note, 48 Ky. L.J. 304 (1960).
The position is there taken that hearings of the board of adjustment are similar
in nature to hearings of the planning commission and suffer from the same in-
adequate procedural standards. In view of their different functions, however, it
may be contended that the board's procedure should approximate judicial
procedure more closely than should the procedure of the commission.
Public dissatisfaction with the operations of the Board of Adjustment has
bubbled up in several editorials in the Lexington Herald and the Lexington
Leader over the past few years and in outspoken comment by, among others,
a leading merchant and the head of a prominent building supply house. See
Graves & Schubert, The Adjustment Sieve, 3 (Lexington) Citizens Association
for Planning Bull. No. 3, March 1961.
1962]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
we intend to use it." One primary reason why issues are not
drawn carefully is that the Board does not insist on it. Another
is that the legal requirements for a variance have not been ad-
hered to nor have substitutional standards been articulated by
the Board. To phrase an issue requires reference to a standard
of some sort.
B. Tim BoARD FREQUENTLY DOES NOT FoLLow THE LAW
APPLICABLE To VARIANcEs
(Herein we suggest what does move the Board.)
Here is the heart of the matter. In section II of this article
we set forth the basic evidence that the Board is not functioning
properly under our Euclidean zoning system. In our examina-
tion of the variance cases, we attempted to test each one by the
legal requirements for a variance. We found that in a majority
of these cases, and particularly where a sign variance was re-
quested, scant attention was paid to the applicable law. The
ordinance also expressly requires specific findings of fact be-
fore a variance can be granted. In very few cases were these
findings reported in the minutes. 177a
Having concluded that the Board did not insist that the legal
requirements for a variance be met, we attempted to determine
on what grounds the Board was deciding cases. Since the Board
seldom gave reasons for its actions, the quest for determining
factors had to proceed without the benefit of much illumina-
tion from the Board. We undertook to specify a list of variables
and test these by our observation of the Board's action and the
meager information that could be gleaned from the petitions
and the minutes. The ones which seemed to affect decision
are set forth below. This is a limited list. It excludes variables
that probably affected, or would affect, decision but for which
no significant correlation during the period of our study could
be discovered. Among these variables are representation by
counsel; ability of the advocate to run persuasive legal, policy,
and planning arguments; moral, social, economic, and planning
177a After this article was set in type, a study of the Alameda County, Calif.,
Board of Adjustment appeared in Comment, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 101 (1962). It states
"that the zoning ordinance is being administered without regard to statutory re-
qirements" (id. at 107), and comes to conclusions about the Alameda County
Board which closely parallel our conclusions about the Lexington Board.
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policy propositions, stating how values ought to be- distributed,
advanced at the hearing;178 all the social, business, and class
identifications and demands of individual board members; the
personal, business, and social relationships of board members to
individual petitioners; and, of course, all the "gastronomic" fac-
tors relating to a member's attitude and sense of well-being
at a particular hearing.
Moreover, the effect upon decision of those variables for
which we found some correlation could not be measured pre-
cisely. The Board's approach in dispensing variances is basically
ad hoc. Each case tends to be decided as an individual case,
with no view to precedent. Adventitious factors can come into
play and upset any system of assigned weights. Therefore the fol-
lowing variables are presented as probable, but unweighted, coun-
ters in decision.
(a) Who the petitioner is. Experienced builders and real-
tors seemed almost invariably to succeed in their petitions.""
A high degree of success was also obtained by established busi-
nesses which wanted to expand or to advertise. The success
of these persons was not due to better prepared petitions nor,
so far as we could ascertain, to more competent advocacy at
the hearings. But it could have been merely fortuitous. The
other variables might have worked to the same result irrespec-
tive of who the petitioner was. Nonetheless, it is possible that
the high incidence of success by established businessmen was
attributable to the fact that the Board members have identifica-
tions with, and perspectives of, the same business and social
groups with which these particular applicants identify.180
The Board members are, or provide professional services for,
businessmen. One of the ideological propositions widely shared
178 "Moral evaluation of legal doctrine may have more influence on . ..
[administrative boards] than on the courts because they are less influenced by
precedent and more responsive to morally impressionable popular will than the
courts." Johnstone, Judicial Consideration of Moral Doctrine in Government
Land Use Control Litigation, 8 Kan. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1959).
179The only well-known builder who did not succeed in getting a variance
or a special exception was George Young, Inc. See text accompanying note
128 supra.
180 Compare Horack & Nolan, Land Use Controls 176-77 (1955): "The
temptation of the members of such boards [of adjustment], particularly in the
community where almost everyone is known to everyone else, is to play the
good fellow and substitute for the tests specified in the statute and ordinance the
following: (1) Will the variance help the applicant, and (2) are the neighbors
complaining?"
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by businessmen, and occasionally articulated by one or more
members of the Board, is that each businessman ought to be able
to decide what is best for his business. Yet this proposition,
unqualified, would not seem to be a sound basis for granting
variances. What is best for one business is not necessarily best
for the community. One of the primary purposes of zoning is
to prevent one landowner from injuring his neighbors or the
community, however profitable a proposed use may be for him.
The legislative judgment of when a use causes the community
harm is embodied in the zoning ordinance. By frequently over-
riding this judgment in response to claimed needs of individual
businesses, the Board may have become insensitive to planning
considerations, including the long range objectives of the com-
prehensive plan and the impact of one individual's land use
upon other land and upon community values.
(b) Claim of competitive disadvantage. For clarity we list
this as a separate factor, although it is closely related to the first.
So frequently did business petitioners who were successful in
their application claim that without a variance they were at a
disadvantage with business competitors in the area or across
the city, we emphasize the probable importance of this claim by
listing it separately. The courts have frequently held that it is
improper to grant a variance merely because the proposed use
of the property would be more profitable.'-" The reason is that
zoning, by prohibiting specified uses of property, necessarily
takes the economic potential of the prohibited use away from
the landowner. Thus, if economic disadvantage were held to
be an unnecessary hardship, the petition for variance would al-
ways have to be granted; zoning would be merely a voluntary
system. Is "competitive disadvantage" the same thing as "eco-
nomic disadvantage?" Is it merely the reverse side of "greater
profit?"
(c) Filling station sign variances. From September, 1960,
to June, 1961, (the end of our study), the Board granted nine out
of nine requests for filling station sign variances. These requests
covered many different fact situations: signs too large, signs too
close to the property line, signs over the roof, signs in older
181 See text accompanying note 16 supra,
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areas with nonconforming signs, signs in newer areas with con-
forming signs, signs illegally erected without a permit. The
Board made no discriminations in context; apparently the con-
trolling factor was simply that this was a petition for a filling
station sign variance. These cases have been analyzed in sec-
tion II(c) (2) above.8 2 We see no reasonable relation between
this factor and any proper ground for a variance.
(d) Nonconforming uses in the neighborhood. The presence
of nonconforming uses or structures in the neighborhood was
usually given great weight by the Board in all kinds of cases
except those involving home occupations. Where there were
such nearby uses, the petitioner's chances of a favorable ruling
were materially increased. The number of nonconforming uses
-whether many or few-did not seem very important. One or
two were sufficient to start this factor operating in petitioner's
favor. Whether this is a sound standard is open to question.
The basic assumption of orthodox zoning law is that conformity
of uses is desirable; many cities have attempted to eliminate
existing nonconforming uses by various restrictive and harassing
schemes. To grant variances on the ground of nearby noncon-
forming uses undercuts this basic policy and results in creeping
nonconformity and, perhaps, deterioration of the district. It
tends to bring about complete nonconformity where the Board,
for legitimate reasons, grants one variance. Witness the sign
variance cases, where one variance became the camel's nose
under the tent. If homogeneity of uses is not to be treated as
a goal of planning, it would seem that the planning commission
and the city council, not a board of adjustment, should make
this decision.
(e) Insubstantial departure from the zoning ordinance. If
a proposed use did not, in the Board's opinion, substantially
affect the comprehensive plan, the petition was likely to succeed.
Only 30% of the petitions for use variances were approved,
whereas 86% of the petitions for bulk variances were granted.
"Insubstantial departures" might be illustrated also by the home
occupation and temporary use petitions, which were granted
rather freely.
18 2 See pp. 297-301 supra.
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Although insubstantial departure alone is not enough to
qualify legally for a variance, in a rational, flexible system of
land use control it would clearly be an important variable. It
may cause difficulty, however, unless it is evaluated with an
eye firmly fixed on the comprehensive plan. If one person wants
to make an insubstantial departure, it may be de minimis; but if
many people want to make the departure the comprehensive plan
may begin to unravel. Then, what is "insubstantial"? Lay boards
and planning experts may evaluate the circumstances differently.
For certain the Lexington Board and the planning staff did not
see eye to eye. In two-thirds of the cases where the planning
staff, taking into account the effect of the variance on the com-
prehensive plan, recommended denial, the Board granted the
variance. If a building permit is to turn on a criterion as vague
as this, the determination should be made by persons who
thoroughly comprehend the goals of the community and the
various interrelations and effects of uses on one another.
(f) Injury to the neighborhood. In a few cases the deci-
sion apparently turned on the Board's belief that the proposed
use would be positively harmful to the neighborhood. These
cases include keeping goats in an R-8 district, moving an old
house onto a too-small lot in a new residential neighborhood,
using a residential front yard as a used car lot, crowding three
families into a one-family house in a slum neighborhood, and
establishing a laundry pick-up station in an R-3 district. Use of
this factor in dispensing variances is sound. One of the legal
requirements for a variance is that the variance not substan-
tially injure the adjoining land.
(g) Protestants. The Board granted 63% of the petitions
where there were protestants, compared with 85% granted where
there were no protestants. Where neighbors favored the petition
or said they had no objection provided certain conditions were
met, the Board granted 91% of the petitions. (The number of pro-
testants, which ranged from 1 to 120, seemed to have no significant
correlation with result.) Giving weight to neighborhood opposi-
tion in a quasi-judicial hearing presents certain difficulties. On
one hand, protestants may present facts and arguments of which
a board is unaware. But mere opposition in and by itself is only
indirectly relevant to the question of individual hardship, which
[Vol. 50,
ZONING BOArD OF ADJUST ENT
is what the Board is supposed to be deciding in variance cases.
It is only some evidence that the neighbors think the variance
will have an adverse effect upon the values in the neighborhood.
Where there is no opposition it may be the result of inertia
or the neighbors may themselves be desirous of applying for a
variance at some future date. From an absence of opposition
no inferences can be drawn that will support either granting
or denying a variance.
If the Board were empowered to make community planning
policy or if it were given wide, flexible powers of administra-
tion, public support or opposition would be quite important. In
legislative and administrative matters the vox populi should be
heard. Inasmuch as the Board took a broad view of its powers
and did not confine itself to a purely adjudicative function, the
amount of attention it paid to protestants was surprisingly
small. 83
(h) Planning staff recommendations. We list this as a fac-
tor, although it may be negligible when the recommendation
is for denial of a variance. Of 102 requests for variances, the
staff recommended denying 75. The Board denied 26. On the
other hand, where the staff recommended granting the variance
the Board's action was almost always in accord. The staff rec-
ommended granting 25 requests for variances; the Board granted
28 of these requests.
The fact that the Board and the staff were so often at odds
gives pause. Was it because the planning staff was applying the
legal requirements for a variance, and the Board viewed these re-
quirements as inflexible and unworkable? Or was it because the
objectives and values of the comprehensive plan had not been
communicated by the staff to the Board? Or was it because the
Board was insensitive to planning considerations? We suspect
the truth would be an amalgam of three affirmative answers.
(i) Persistence of petitioner. Where a petitioner, once
denied, applied for a rehearing or applied a second time for a
183 The weight accorded protestants by the Lexington Board appears to be
much less than that accorded protestants elsewhere. For example, in Phila-
delphia during a nine-week period in 1954, the board of adjustment granted
only 23.9% of variances requested where protestants appeared, compared with
78.7% where there were no protestants. Note, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 516, 542 nn.
189, 190 (1955).
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variance, his chance of success increased. The board heard
fourteen such petitions and reversed itself in ten. The evidence
in most of these reversals was substantially the same as was pro-
duced on first hearing.184
(j) Uniqueness of property. Where the Board denied a
variance, it sometimes stated there was nothing unique about
the property, apparently resting on one of the legal requirements
for a variance. On the other hand, the uniqueness of the prop-
erty was seldom mentioned when a variance was granted. Thus
one could say that petitioner must prove his hardship is unique
if the other factors do not work to his advantage.
Obviously this list of vague variables is of limited use to a
person who is interested in predicting the Board's response
to a wide variety of fact situations. It is, in a sense, more telling
in what it omits than in what it includes. Yet further delineation
is hopeless until the Board itself becomes more articulate. With-
out help from the Board, generalities in the process of refine-
ment dissolve into pure conjecture.
C. Tim FA.muRE OF THm BoARD To FiND FAcTs AN STATE REASONS
SERIOUSLY INHIITs THE DEVELOPmENT OF A SYSTEM OF
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE LAW WHICH AssuPxs PETrIoNERS OF
EQUAL TREATMENT
In any system of ad hoc decision-making serious problems of
equal protection of the law arise. As indicated above, the Board
has to a very large extent shifted to an ad hoc system of vari-
ance granting. Whatever one may say about the legality of the
Board's action in failing to follow standards laid down by the
enabling act, the ordinance, and the courts, justice could still
be dispensed if the Board promulgated standards of its own
making or articulated in each case the substantive factors it con-
sidered critical. But it has done neither. The public and the
petitioners are not candidly told in advance of a case what factors
really move the Board, nor are they told afterwards. To be blunt,
why the Board behaves as it does is anyone's guess and anyone's
rumor.
184 In Sipperley v. Board of Appeals on Zoning, 140 Conn. 164, 98 A.2d
907 (1953), it was held that a zoning board of appeals has no power to reverse
itself unless a change of conditions has occurred since the prior decision or some
material new factor then nonexistent has arisen.
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The procedures for reporting the Board's actions have not
led to a slow case-by-case evolution of standards, which is the
least the common law tradition of justice demands. The min-
utes are inadequately informative. They include, along with
the formal orders of the Board, only what evidence or remarks
a secretary chooses to include as important or interesting. There
is no oral or written opinion by the Board telling interested per-
sons why the decision is right or wise.'85 Nor are there any
formal findings of fact or conclusions of law.
Without findings of fact or a statement of reasons for the
decision, case-by-case development of standards is near-impos-
sible. After thirty years of Board of Adjustment decisions prop-
erty owners are as much in the dark about what moves the Board
as they were when the Board was organized in 1931. Contrary
to what some administrative law writers have claimed with re-
spect to federal agencies,'8 an adequate explanation of decision
is not, with respect to local zoning boards, needed primarily to
serve as a basis for judicial review. Only two of the 167 cases
in our study were appealed. Rather it is needed for the develop-
ment of a reliable body of precedents and for some assurance
of equal protection of the law.
One of the safeguards the common law developed against
arbitrary decisions is the practice, usually adhered to, of judges
giving reasons or opinions. This requires a judge to justify his
decision by doctrine, statute, policy, or logic, with an eye to
previous cases with similar facts. Opinion writing thus gen-
erates a compelling pressure toward continuity and equal pro-
tection of the law.
Under section 8(b) of the federal Administrative Procedure
Act federal administrative agencies are required to give a state-
ment of "findings and conclusions, as well as the reasons or basis
therefor, upon all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion
presented."18 7 A comparable requirement of findings of fact and
conclusions of law can be found in section 12 of the Revised
185 Failure to give reasons appears to be a characteristic of board practices
throughout the country. Professor Haar has noted: "During the year 1952, Cam-
bridge granted 48 use variances, denied 9; granted 51 bulk variances, denied 8.
(Incidentally, no decision, either affirming or denying a grant, made any men-
tion of the reasons for the Board's action.) ' Haar, op. cit. supra note 174, at 296.
180 See 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§ 16.05, 16.12 (1958).
18760 Stat. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1007(b) (1958).
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Model State Administrative Procedure Act applicable to state
administrative agencies (not adopted in Kentucky).' There
is no statutory requirement in Kentucky or in most states, how-
ever, that local zoning boards set out findings, conclusions, or
reasons. Nor have courts generally seen fit to require any of
these except as a basis for review in cases that are appealed.
We believe a strong argument can be made that a decision
by a local administrative board staffed by laymen, which omits
any findings or conclusions or reasons and merely states the peti-
tion is "granted" or "denied," denies due process of law. There
are some decisions of the United States Supreme Court 8 9 and
of state courts190 which would support this view. Modem com-
mentators, however, generally take the position that the Consti-
tution does not require administrative findings or statement of
reasons; they view the Supreme Court cases as abandoned
ships.191 They support this position with an analogy to the
practice of judges not to give findings, reasons, or opinions in
several kinds of cases. As persuasive as this position is with
respect to federal administrative agencies, we are not entirely
convinced that no stricter guarantees of due process should
be required of local zoning boards than are required of federal
agencies and courts. Members of the zoning board of adjust-
ment usually lack both the law-conditioning of judges and the
expertise of federal administrators. They are subject to great
pressure from people whom they know personally and with
whom they do business-pressure which evidence shows they
cannot resist half so effectively as independent and salaried
judges and federal administrators. Proceedings before a zoning
188 The statutory requirements in Kentucky respecting administrative find-
ings, conclusions, reasons, ana records differ for each state administrative agency
and are chaotic. See Kentucky Legislative Research Commission, Report on Ken-
tucky Administrative Procedure Legislation, June 22, 1961. S.B. 854, a bill
which failed of passage in the 1962 General Assembly, would have established
a uniform administrative procedure in Kentucky based upon the Model Act.
189 Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 888 (1985); Wichita Ry. & Light
Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48 (1922).
190 E.g., Laney v. Holbrook, 150 Fla. 622, 8 So.2d 465 (1942); A. Dicillo
& Sons v. Chester Zoning Bd., 98 N.E.2d 352 (Ohio Ct. of Com. Pleas, 1950).
'Cf. Reeves v. Jefferson County, 245 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Ky. 1952), where the
court said, "The order as entered by the Commission was supported by essential
findings and in keeping with constitutional and legislative requirements." See
also Louisville & N.R.R. v. Commonwealth, 314 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1958).
191 See 2 Davis, op. cit. supra note 186, at §§ 16.04, 16.12.
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board are ordinarily ex parte, with no high-priced expert counsel
representing the petitioner and with no adversary ready to appeal
any misapplication of law. And unlike federal agencies that deal
with cases of great national interest, zoning boards have not come
under the scrutiny of administrative law experts, legislative com-
mittees, and newspaper reporters. Thus many of the factors which
combine to steady judicial and federal administrative decisions
even without findings, reasons, or opinions are missing. When
the climate surrounding decision making is different, it is argu-
able that the constitutional requirements for due process of law
should adjust accordingly. A state court may, of course, interpret
the due process clause of a state constitution to require more
in the way of procedural guarantees than are required by the
same clause of the federal constitution.
In this connection the procedure of local planning authori-
ties in England may be worth noting. There, before any struc-
ture may be built or any existing use changed, planning per-
mission must be granted by the local planning authority. This
authority has broad discretionary power to grant or deny per-
mission. But Parliament has provided numerous safeguards
against the unbridled use of power. Two are especially pert-
inent here. First, every local planning authority is required
to have a development plan, which provides policy guidelines
for the exercise of discretion. 92 This plan is far more articulate
than most comprehensive plans in this country in detailing
reasons why specified land uses are desirable and in setting
forth information from which an intelligent prophecy of deci-
sion can be made. Second, if planning permission is granted
subject to conditions or is refused, the local authority must
give a written statement of reasons.'93 While the English have
no written constitution as such, their traditional conventions of
"natural justice," which is roughly equivalent to our "due process,
require a statement of reasons for a planning refusal. More-
over, any applicant denied permission may demand an inquiry,
which is a de novo hearing by an inspector appointed by the
Minister of Housing and Local Government. The inspector
192 Town & Country Planning Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 51, § 5(1).
293 Town & Country Planning (General Development) Order, 1948 (S.L
1948, No. 958).
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renders a written report, on the basis of which the Minister may
sustain or reverse the local authority's decision.
This procedure protects the individual. No case can be de-
cided against him without his knowing why.194 The public interest
is protected from local abuse of discretion by the policy guide-
lines set forth in the development plan and by the broad super-
visory powers of the Minister. The Minister is authorized to
tighten restrictions on, or wholly prohibit, the granting of plan-
ning permissions by local authorities in any particular area or in
any particular cases. He has a general default power to act
himself if the local authority does not operate in a manner he
deems satisfactory. And the Minister, of course, must answer
in Parliament for his actions. An essential element in English
"due process" is that everyone with power must answer to
someone; individuals must be told why the state is restraining
them in the use of their land.
The main objection advanced against requiring a statement
of reasons by a zoning board is the time required. Even assum-
ing that the amount of time available should override tradi-
tional safeguards of liberty, this objection may be overcome.
Boards could follow the practice of some English courts and
deliver oral statements, transcribed by a stenographer. If this
practice is not feasible, consideration should be given to put-
ting the variance power in a body which does have time to give
reasons. Otherwise the board of adjustment can, and does, rule
with no practical limits on its discretion.
If boards of adjustment are to be continued in their present
form and are expected to operate in accordance with the pre-
scribed legal standards of Euclidean zoning, a requirement that
a board, before it grants a variance, must make a written find-
ing that petitioner does not receive a reasonable return from,
or have a reasonably beneficial use of, his property-coupled
with a requirement that the board must in every case give a full
and adequate statement of its reasons-might do more than
194 However, local authorities appear to have fallen into the practice of
stating perfunctory reasons. See Report of the Committee on Administrative
Tribunals and Inquiries (the Franks Committee), Cmd. No. 218, July 1957. The
Franks Committee recommended that a full and adequate statement of reasons
be required. The Minister of Housing and Local Government has attempted to
implement this recommendation in Circular No. 9/58, Feb. 27, 1958.
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anything else to make a variance procedure within a Euclidean
zoning system work. In section VII we shall suggest that the
premises of Euclidean zoning are unsound and that it is un-
realistic to expect a board of adjustment to operate within the
narrow legal confines of that system. If the necessity of wide
discretionary powers is recognized the requirement of an ade-
quate explanation of decision becomes even more imperative.
D. THE BoAiu's ViEw OF ITS FUNCTION Is NOT WHOLLY
COMPATIBLE wrm ITs DuTiES AND ITS BEsPONSIBILITIEs
One commentator has said that boards of adjustment com-
monly "see their function as a broker for the individual citizen
against the inevitable comprehensiveness of the law."1 5 This
observation might well have been made of the Lexington Board
of Adjustment. During the seventeen month period of our study
the Board was composed of two lawyers, two businessmen, an
architect and a real estate dealer. Quite naturally most of these
men moved freely among, and had business connections with,
persons in the building industry and property-owning citizens
at large. One does not take the veil or the robe when he goes
on a board of adjustment. He is not retired from the business
world, as judges are.
The fact that a board of adjustment is a lay board, composed
largely of businessmen, results in a profound difference in at-
titude from that of a court. While the ideal is that board mem-
bers should be as genuinely dispassionate and objective as judges,
as a practical matter this is impossible. The independence of
full-time professional judges is secured by traditions, influences,
and motivations which do not beat upon the consciousness of
a part-time lay board of adjustment. Board members who have
the same general perspectives as the litigants who appear be-
fore them simply cannot meet one afternoon a month and for
that one session slough off all their identifications with the
business community and the propertied class acquired over the
other twenty-nine days. For good psychological reasons they
cannot every thirtieth day see themselves as impartial officials
enforcing an impartial law.
195 Frost, The Trouble with Zoning, 47 Natl Munic. Rev. 275, 277 (1958).
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Perhaps because they assume their role with attitudes dif-
ferent from a judge's, some members of the Lexington Board
have occasionally acted with doubtful regard for the spirit of
judicial proprieties. One member sat and voted in favor of a
variance for a building for which his firm was the architect. 19
Another member erected a sign in violation of the ordinance and
then applied for a variance, submitting no reasons therefor;
the variance was granted.197 Another member represented a
client at a hearing before the Board. 9' And in an unusual dis-
play of irritation the Board "ejected" from its April, 1961,
meeting the former president of the Lexington Citizens Associa-
tion for Planning, Richard Schubert, who was sitting as an ob-
server.'99 More recently, one member, casting aside the tradi-
tional judicial unwillingness to defend decisions outside of court,
replied to a newspaper editorial mildly critical of a decision
of the Board with a letter to the editor.200 (The points he made
in the letter were all sound, but would it not have been better
for them to have been made in a recorded oral or written opin-
ion which would have headed off the newspaper's criticism?)
We wish to make clear, however, that apart from these few
actions which may border on impropriety we think the opera-
tional weaknesses disclosed by this study are inherent in a board
of adjustment system and are not the fault of the present mem-
bers of the Board. Earlier studies of this same Board when it
had three different members came to conclusions about the
shortcomings of the Board of Adjustment that are essentially
similar to those we have set forth in this section.201 Hence we
1 9 6 See note 48 supra.
197 See text accompanying note 88 supra.
198 See note 170 supra.
199 Lexington Leader, April 15, 1961, p. 1, col. 6. The Leader reported that
several members of the Board were "incensed" by the CAP March Bulletin,
which printed an unsigned article criticizing the high number of variances
granted and the procedures of the Board. According to the Leader, one Board
member asked Mr. Schubert who wrote the article. Mr. Schubert declined to
say; whereupon the member moved to exclude the public from the meeting,
which was in executive session. Mr. Schubert then walked out, followed by ob-
servers from the League of Women Voters.
200 Lexington Herald, Nov. 22, 1961, p. 4, col. 4.
2o See Note, The Granting of Variances from the Zoning Ordinance by the
Lexington-Fayette County Board of Adjustment, 45 Ky. L.J. 496 (1957); Meade,
Conduct of Hearings before the Lexington Board of Adjustment and Planning
Commission, May 1957 (study on file at the University of Kentucky College of
Law); Park, The Lexington Zoning Board of Adjustment, May 1957 (study on
fie at the University of Kentucky College of Law).
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doubt that substantially different results would obtain with a
change in membership.
The reasons why these weaknesses are inherent in a board of
adjustment system are several. First, a zoning board of adjust-
ment is a lay board, usually composed of persons untrained in
law and without a strong orientation toward the constitutional
values of due process and equal protection of the law. Nor do
they have the saving quality of expertise, the strength of the
modem administrative process. Lay members commonly lack
comprehension of the planning goals of the community and
the conditions necessary for achieving those goals. In fair-
ness to the Lexington Board, however, it must be added that the
goals of the community have not been revealed to it through
any articulate, public-supported series of master plans. Only
in the last year has an adequate permanent planning staff been
engaged, with explicit instructions from the city fathers to make
long-range master plans setting forth policy guidelines for urban
development. Second, the members are given the trying task
of carefully letting off steam within the tight compartments of
a Euclidean zoning scheme where the controlling mechanisms
-the legal requirements for a variance-do not respond to pres-
sures for diversity and flexibility. More and more, the difficulties
of administering Euclidean zoning are appearing. Third, the
law being out of joint with reality, the board has had to re-shape
the variance system by Pickwickian language and non-disclosure,
with all the unhappy consequences such means entail. Fourth,
the climate of opinion in relation to local government involves a
complex of attitudes and value relationships which in many cities,
including Lexington, is exceedingly tolerant of lax administra-
tion. The climate of opinion has affected, and probably will con-
tinue to affect, the nature, extent, and efficiency of land use con-
trols exercised by a board of adjustment.
E. Wrrm WHAT EFFEcr ON THE COMMUNITY PLAN?
How did the Board's actions in variance cases affect the
achievement of the community's basic values? The large number
of interdependent variables one must take into account in determ-
ining the effect of use of one parcel of land upon other land and
19621
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upon the community at large makes that question exceedingly
difficult to answer. These variables include:
a. the effect on the overall physical design of the city (No one
variance was a major land use change which spectacularly
enlarged the physical dimensions of the city, but cumu-
latively variances may have significantly changed the pat-
tern of uses);
b. the effect on the efficient functioning of the habitation,
productive, and servicing components of the community;
c. the effect on the quantity of land devoted to particular
uses;
d. the effect on residential and commercial density (Did the
variances contribute to sprawl and disintegration of the
core?);
e. the effect on real income in the community (Increased
or decreased? For few or for many?);
f. the effect on traffic patterns and congestion;
g. the effect on public utilities and community facilities;
h. the effect on the particular neighborhood (Did variances
increase or decrease noise, traffic, air pollution, property
values, convenience, amenities, privacy, opportunities for
social contacts, opportunities for a normal family life?)
Other conditioning factors besides variances also would have to
be considered and their influences and interrelations tested.
Hence to answer the question would require a study far beyond
the scope of this project. (This project was undertaken, we re-
gret to say, without a foundation grant.)
Nonetheless, there is some evidence at hand indicating that
a high proportion of these variances had an undesirable effect
upon the community plan. The planning staff, which is sup-
posed to have specialized knowledge about the interrelation of
land uses, recommended that 26 variances be granted and 75
denied. The Board granted 76 and denied 26, which is almost
a precise reversal of the staff ratio. Other evidence can be found
in the sign variances granted. No observer of Lexington over the
past few years can fail to note the increasing crass ugliness
of the city and the increase in nonconforming signs of every
kind. On the New Circle Road alone more than sixty signs
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have been erected too close to the road, too large, or too high
in the air. Three new shopping centers-Idle Hour, Gardenside,
and Zandale-have had the symmetry of their design spoiled
by nonconforming signs. In addition, in an explosion of capitalist
enterprise advertising signs have spilled out on the surround-
ing green farmland, which Westbrook Pegler, who is not given
to encomiums, called "the sweetest countryside on earth." The
ultimate social and economic cost to the community of the
Board's sign dispensations will be difficult to measure. But
undesirable effects may already be observed. If the other vari-
ances granted have as unfortunate effects as the sign variances,
the integrity of the comprehensive plan may be in more danger
than we think.
It should also be noted that variances make the zoning map
unreliable for purchasers of property. Since a variance is nowhere
recorded in a manner so that it is readily discoverable by a pur-
chaser of property in the area, the purchaser buys at his peril. The
zoning map gives him notice of uses permitted, but he may find,
after purchase, that the owner next door was granted a variance
for an objectionable use several years ago and is only now ready
to make use of it. There is no practical way under present Board
of Adjustment procedures for the purchaser to ascertain this fact
prior to purchase.
VII. THE PROBLEM RE-EXAMINED
Some flfty years ago, when zoning began, its advocates as-
sumed that landowners could be protected from the injurious
effects of other land uses by dividing up the city-with houses
here, businesses over there, and industry somewhere else. This
method of land use control, which Professor Haar has aptly
called Euclidean zoning after the famous Euclid case holding it
constitutional,20 2 rested upon various assumptions about desir-
able land use, the demands of the market, and economic and
social changes. It saw the ideal city as a great pattern of con-
trasting districts, rigidly separating incompatible types of land
uses. It assumed that similar uses naturally tend to congregate
in homogenous areas, that development takes place lot-by-lot
202 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See Haar,
Emerging Legal Issues in Zoning, in Planning 138 (1954).
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on small parcels, that shifts of social groups and land values
come about slowly, and that where and when and how develop-
ment takes place can be predicted and regulated in advance.
It did not reckon with the swift advances in technology, transpor-
tation, and communication, and the dynamic growth of American
cities, which have wrought changes in every old neighborhood
and rung in new kinds of suburban development.
The new technology made old uses obsolete and brought
social changes which altered the urban behavior patterns and
the demands for land. The automobile doomed the downtown
grocery. Convenience shopping has moved to the suburbs, where
houses are built not by individuals but by real estate syndicates
on large tracts of land. Industry no longer necessarily belches
smoke and shatters the eardrums; clean industry claims to be a
good neighbor. The never-ending construction of new highways
constantly shifts land values from one place to another. Even
the basic policy assumption of Euclidean zoning-that homogen-
eity of uses is desirable-has come to be questioned. Professor
Haar and Norman Williams, among others, have pointed out
that it can result in undemocratic economic and social segrega-
tion.203 And in a recent provocative book Jane Jacobs leveled a
blast at the entire concept of homogeneity; a vital, successful
city district, she argues, requires diversity of primary uses.2 04
Be that as it may, one thing has become clear. The allocation
of land use to meet the community's needs and the consumer's
demands proved to be much more complex and require much
more flexibility than the drafters of Euclidean ordinances
dreamed. Experience demonstrated the impossibility of syn-
thesizing the uses of land by a rigid mechanical approach.
Euclidean planners were not, after all, seers.
Euclidean zoning ordinances provided three methods by
which some flexibility could be introduced into the system. The
first was by way of amendment to the ordinance by the legis-
lative body, usually with the advice and consent of the planning
commission. The second was by creating special exceptions
203 Hoar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66
Harv. L. Rev. 1051 (1953); Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20
Law & Contemp. Prob. 317 (1955).
204 Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961).
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in the ordinance. The third was through variances granted by
the board of adjustment. The variance procedure was not de-
signed for the purpose of giving planning flexibility but for the
purpose of alleviating a unique hardship. Nonetheless, planning
flexibility could, and did, come in by this back door method.
Indeed, today it is the most frequently used (or, more accur-
ately, misused) method of administering flexible controls. The
primary reason for this metamorphosis is not far to seek. It lies
in the unrealistic assumption of Euclidean zoning that little
flexibility is needed and in the difficulty of using the amendment
and special exception devices to achieve the flexibility which
experience has shown to be necessary. A brief examination of
these two devices will indicate how the pressures for change
have been directed, consciously or unconsciously, to the vari-
ance back door.
The landowner who wishes to use his land in a way not
permitted by the ordinance can, as a first alternative, go for an
amendment. But his path is a tortuous one. By law or by prac-
tice both the planning commission and the legislative body must
approve the change. And numerous legal as well as planning ob-
stacles must be overcome. Among the legal doctrines restrict-
ing the amendment process are the following: (1) No zoning
of one lot (the Sin of Spot Zoning). Zoning of one lot is per-
missible if done "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" and
not as a favor to the landowner. But, because the legal meaning
of "a comprehensive plan" is unsettled and the possibility of
judicial reversal so strong, as a matter of practice planning com-
missions and local legislatures usually refuse to consider rezon-
ing only one small lot. (2) No zoning for one use only (the
Heresy of One-Use Classification).205 (3) No zone change sub-
ject to conditions; restrictions must be uniform throughout the
205 See Pierson Trapp Co. v. Peak, 340 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Ky. 1960):
Nowhere in the field of zoning law do we find any indication that the
zoning authority may establish a zone or district that is limited to only one
particular use. Our concept of the legitimate scope of the zoning power
does not extend it to the point of embracing the power to restrict the use
of property other than to reasonable general classifications.
Cf. Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mt. Vernon, 307 N.Y. 498, 121 N.E.2d
517 (1954). This restrictive notion applies to nonresidential classifications only.
The power to zone for one type of residential use was established in the Euclid
case in 1926.
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district °osa This doctrine prevents the planning commission from
requiring that the proposed use be designed in a way com-
patible with the neighborhood. If the zone is changed, the
proposed use can then be redesigned or changed so as to in-
jure the neighbors. Hence the planning commission is usually
reluctant to approve an amendment on the basis of an unen-
forceable promise by the petitioner that the proposed use will
be erected and maintained in accordance with the plan sub-
mitted by the petitioner. (4) No contract zoning. The commis-
sion cannot require restrictive covenants to be put on the lot
as a quid pro quo for rezoning.2 0 6 (5) No regulations solely for
aesthetic objectives. °7 This doctrine inhibits the control of design,
which is frequently necessary to make mixed uses compatible.
(6) No "floating zone."20 8 A floating zone is a zone provided in
the ordinance to which no land is assigned on the zoning map
until a landowner requests, and is granted, such zoning classi-
fication. It is one method of determining desirable uses lot-by-lot.
In addition to legal doctrines which restrict the amendment
process, outmoded and inflexible planning concepts may decrease
the landowner's chances of success in securing an amendment.
For example, set-back lines and side yard lines, devised for the
bungalow on a single lot, may be unsuitable for ranch houses
and atrium houses; developers may wish to arrange their open
spaces in what they conceive to be a more desirable pattern
than results from the standard bulk regulations.0 9 In a land use
205a Cf. Rathkopf & Rathkopf, op. cit. supra note 24, at 26-10 n.14.
206 Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959); Houston
Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Products Credit Ass'n., 9 N.J. 122, 87 A.2d 819
(1952). But see Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680 (1960).
207 See Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 218 (1955).
208 Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Lower Gwynned Township, 401
Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960). Contra, Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 802 N.Y.
115, 96 N.E.2d 781 (1951). In the Lower Gwynned case the court seemed to
think the board of adjustment is more fit to administer flexibility than is the
legislative body, upon recommendation of the planning commission. ("Under
the 'flexible selective zoning' scheme here under attack, changes in the prevail-
ing zoning regulations are to be made on a case b case basis, not, however, by
a specialized body such as the zoning board of adjustment, but by the legisla-
tive body, without rigid statutory standards .. . 401 Pa. at 220, 164 A.2d at 12.)
Quaere. For an excellent discussion of the legal and planning issues raised by
the "floating zone," see Haar & Hering, The Lower Gwtynned Case: Too Flexible
Zoning or An Inflexible Judiciary?, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 241 (1959).
209 See Goldston & Scheuer, Zoning of Planned Residential Development, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 241 (1959); New Approaches to Residential Land Development
Urban Land Institute Tech. Bull. No. 40 (1961); Density Zoning, Urban Land
Institute Tech. Bull. No. 42 (1961).
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control system which lacks the continuing application of intelli-
gence, planning concepts, such as bungalow-based bulk require-
ments, soon lose touch with the demands of the real estate market
for experiments in improved urban design.
What often happened when zoning first swept the country
was this: The city fathers called in an outside expert who
made a swift survey of the city and then prepared a zoning
map. If any master plan or surveys of physical, economic, and
sociological conditions in the city were prepared, as likely as
not they were filed away in a bottom drawer. The zoning map
"stabilized property values" and that was what the city fathers
were interested in. No resident planner was hired. Influenced
by Euclidean concepts, the city fathers thought the purposes of
planning could be achieved by a single exercise; after all, great
change was not expected. Not until the smaller cities were beset
by the population explosion and urban sprawl in the late 1940's
did they begin to hire resident planners. Indeed, not until 1961
did Lexington acquire a staff of long-range planners to re-ex-
amine planning concepts incrusted in the zoning ordinance thirty
years ago. Thus zoning became out of date through lack of
periodic revision. Without expert advice, when an amendment
was requested the city fathers usually stuck by the old fash-
ioned notions of what was desirable and undesirable land use.210
All these restrictions on, and defects of, the policy making and
administrative apparatus (the legislative body, the planning com-
mission, and the planning staff) created strong pressures on the
board of adjustment to grant variances. With some truth it may
be said that the rigidity of the amending process proved the un-
doing of the board of adjustment.
The second method by which some flexibility can be intro-
duced into Euclidean zoning is by way of special exceptions-
2 10 See Fritts v. City of Ashland, 848 S.W.2d 712, 714-15 (Ky. 1961):
An examination of the multitude of zoning cases that have reached this
court leads us to the conclusion that the common practice of zoning agencies,
after the adoption of an original ordinance, is simply to wait until some
property owner finds an opportunity to acquire a financial advantage by
devoting his property to a use other than that for which it is zone , and
then struggle with the question of whether some excuse can be found for
complying with his request for a rezoning.... [Tlhe courts have upheld or
invalidated the change according to how flagrant the violation of true
zoning principles has been. It is to be hoped that in the future zoning
authorities will give recognition to the fact that an essential feature of
zoning is planning.
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uses permitted by the zoning ordinance if they comply with
specified conditions. This device, which has great potential
for a flexible zoning scheme, has in fact been little used and
widely misunderstood. Only in the last decade have courts begun
to comprehend clearly the distinction between a special excep-
tion and a variance. 1' Many reasons underly its nonuse. One
is the enormous difficulty of foreseeing all the different types
of uses to which an owner may wish to put his land and of set-
ting forth the conditioning factors by which the compatibility
of those uses with the neighborhood may be judged in advance.
Therefore, the list of special exceptions in the ordinary zoning
ordinance is likely to mirror the past and be limited to a small
number of anticipated uses. And even with those, the conditions
on which they will be permitted are not usually spelled out in
any great detail. Where the ordinance is not periodically re-
vised the special exceptions can become more quaint than useful.
The flexible use of special exceptions, like the flexible use
of the amending process, has been regarded suspiciously by
judges brought up in the faith of Euclidean zoning. In Rockhill
v. Chesterfield Township, 12 for example, the entire town was
in effect zoned as one residential district. Neighborhood busi-
nesses, shopping centers, restaurants, light industry, and other
nonresidential uses were permitted as special exceptions, pro-
vided they complied with certain conditions and specifications
and "only after investigation has shown that such structures and
uses will be beneficial to the general development." The court
viewed the ordinance as the "antithesis of zoning," flouting the
"essential concept of district zoning according to a comprehen-
sive plan." Thus it was held to be ultra vires the enabling act.
The third way open to the landowner who wants to use his
land contrary to the zoning ordinance is to apply to the board
of adjustment for a variance. Enabling acts generally empower
boards to grant variances where there is some "practical diffi-
culty" or "unnecessary hardship" and the dispensation will "not
be contrary to the spirit and intent of the zoning ordinance."
Instead of giving this language a broad interpretation, courts
211 See Kline v. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Zoning Adjustment,
325 S.W.2d 324 (Ky. 1959).
21 23 N.J. 117, 128 A.2d 473 (1956).
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have progressively narrowed it, perhaps in reaction to the wide-
spread abuse of the variance power. 13 Thus, even though the
land-owner is able to prove conclusively that the proposed use
is beneficial to the community, does not involve a substantial
departure from the comprehensive plan, and will not injuriously
affect the neighborhood, this is not enough legally to invoke the
board's power to grant a variance. Because of the courts' narrow
interpretation of the enabling act, the owner must prove in ad-
dition that the land has no reasonably beneficial use without
a variance, that the hardship is unique to his lot, and that the
hardship is not self-created. Here again, as in the case of amend-
ments and special exceptions, courts have consciously limited
flexibility. This judicial attitude reflects a faith that the original
concept of a board of adjustment's function in a Euclidean zon-
ing system is still viable.
In truth an unhealthy situation has resulted. A power
vacuum has occurred. There is no body with the legal power to
permit on one particular lot one specific use that is beneficial
(or, if not beneficial, at least not harmful) to the community,
does not involve a substantial departure from the plan, and will
not injuriously affect the neighborhood. This gap in Euclidean
theory is well illustrated by two interesting cases which arose in
Lexington several years ago. One batted around between the
Planning Commission and the Board of Adjustment. The other
ultimately went to the Court of Appeals.
The facts of the first case were these. For several years prior
to 1935 a house in a Negro district known as "Chicago Bottom"
was used as a funeral home-a nonconforming use in a Resi-
dence-S zone. From 1935 to 1954 the house was occupied by a
physician as a residence. He also maintained his office on the
premises. After his death the house was occupied solely as a
residence. In 1956 the Edward W. Jackson Funeral Home de-
218 This attitude of narrow construction appears again and again in modem
cases. E.g.: The enabling act "sharply limits" and "narrows in a drastic manner"
the board's power to grant variances. Kline v. Louisville & Jefferson County
Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 325 S.W.2d 824, 327, 328 (Ky. 1959). "[T]his court
has imposed strict and severe limitations upon the granting of variances." Con-
way, J., in Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 129, 96 N.E.2d 731,
738 (1951) (dissenting opinion). In reviewing variances, "this Court has been
quite demanding." Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Lower Gwynned Town-
ship, 401 Pa. 211, 220, 164 A.2d 7, 12 (1960).
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sired to reopen a funeral home on the premises, but it could not
be permitted as a continuation of the nonconforming use, which
had long since been abandoned. The owner applied to the
Planning Commission for a change of zone from Residence-S
to Business-i, in which district a funeral home is permitted.
The neighbors objected. They did not mind the funeral home,
but they objected to rezoning on the ground that all sorts of
undesirable businesses were permitted in a B-1 zone and if the
tract were rezoned it might be used for other than an under-
taking parlor. The Planning Commission refused to rezone:
there was no way the Commission could restrict the use to a
funeral home. The owner then appealed to the Board of Ad-
justment for a variance. In candor he confessed there was no
hardship within the meaning of the statute, and the planning
staff advised the Board it had no power to grant a variance.
Yet the neighbors appeared and favored a variance that would
permit a funeral home, and that use only. The funeral home
served as a sort of "neighborhood center" in an area where wakes
were part of the cultural pattern and undertakers were com-
munity leaders. The Board granted the variance. 14 While legally
this may have been improper, was it bad planning?21 5
A passage in Jane Jacobs' recent book attacking the "familiar
superstitions" and "oversimplifications" of orthodox planning
illuminates the issues raised by the Jackson Funeral Home case.
Writes Mrs. Jacobs:
Nowadays, the glue factory has been replaced by a dif-
ferent bogy, the "mortuary," which is trotted out as a
crowning example of the horrors that insinuate their way
into neighborhoods which lack tight control on uses. Yet
mortuaries, or funeral parlors as we call them in the city,
seem to do no harm. Perhaps in vital, diversified city
neighborhoods, in the midst of life, the reminder of death
is not the pall it may be on waning suburban streets....
214 Edward W. Jackson Funeral Home, March 1956.
215 This question might be asked about a number of board cases which we
have previously criticized as not complying with the law. Without a great many
more facts than are set forth in the petition or in the minutes concerning the
effects of the proposed use on other land uses and community values, the ques-
tion cannot be answered intelligently. But the point is: In a rational system of
land use control, someone with knowledge of all the pertinent facts and the
effects of the proposed use on the neighborhood and on community values
should be empowered to answer the question and issue permits accordingly.
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In low-income neighborhoods of big cities, such as New
York's East Harlem, funeral parlors can, and often do,
operate as positive and constructive forces. This is be-
cause a funeral parlor presupposes an undertaker. Under-
takers, like druggists, lawyers, dentists and clergymen, are
representatives, in these neighborhoods, of such qualities
as dignity, ambition and knowledgeability. They are typ-
ically well-known public characters, active in local civic
life. Quite often, they eventually go into politics too.
Like so much of orthodox planning, the presumed harm
done by this use and that use has been somehow accepted
without anyone's asking the questions, "Why is it harmful?
Just how does it do harm, and what is this harm?"216
The second case illustrating the power vacuum of Euclidean
zoning involved the conversion into an apartment of a carriage
house on the Near North Side of Lexington. The Near North
Side is an old residential quarter of very fine houses with an
illustrious past. It has many simliarities to Georgetown in
Washington, and a good part of it today is in the special "Old
and Historic Lexington District," where changes in exterior
facade are forbidden without permission of the Board of Archi-
tectural Review. Behind many of the houses, or located on mews,
are carriage houses or servants' houses. With the disappearance
of servants from the American scene, these dependencies fell
into disuse. And, quite naturally, many people wanted to con-
vert them into apartments for commercial renting. In 1946 the
owner of one of these old houses applied for a variance which
would permit him to ignore bulk requirements of the ordinance
and rent as an apartment former servants' quarters located on the
second floor of the carriage house. The ordinance required that
every building used as a dwelling in the district (except as a
dwelling for servants) have "an exclusive unobstructed ease-
ment or right of way at least 15 feet wide to a street." The owner
could not comply with this requirement: the mews on which
the carriage house sat was only 11 feet wide, and the larger side
yard of the big house was only 15 feet wide, of which 6 feet had
to be used under the ordinance as side yard space of the big
house and not as easement. The Board refused to grant a vari-
216 Jacobs, op. cit. supra note 204, at 232-33.
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ance and was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals. 17
The Near North Side is a changing area and obviously will have
to regenerate itself into a different kind of life. A persuasive
argument can be made that the best use of the carriage houses
in this area would be conversion into stylish apartments of great
charm, and indeed a few carriage houses in the area with street
access which satisfies the ordinance have been so converted
and rent at top prices. (This particular carriage house still lies
vacant, coveted by nearly all who see it.) But such an argument
is misdirected at the Board of Adjustment under Euclidean theory;
it is pertinent to the question of hardship only after the hurdles of
"no reasonable use" and "uniqueness of the lot" have been
overcome. And because of the great difficulty in dealing by
general regulation with the different physical locations of numer-
ous carriage houses and garages, the Planning Commission can-
not establish realistic, detailed criteria to govern conversion.
The interrelation of conditioning factors can seldom be precisely
known in advance. Who, then, is to deal with the problem? Must
the area decline because there is no flexible way to control land
uses to give the neighborhood a desirable new character?
The decline of changing, older areas in our cities has to
some extent been exacerbated by Euclidean concepts, which deal
only with general types of uses. Euclidean zoning does not
ordinarily concern itself with the proposed design of any par-
ticular use and its compatibility with the area nor with the
quantity of land which can be devoted to one specific use. It
assumes that one grocery store is like another grocery store-
no matter how designed. And, because it uses general classifica-
tions, it assumes a grocery is like a cinema is like a restaurant is
like a tailor shop is like a drug store. But in terms of satisfying
the needs of a particular area and of compatibility with the
area this is not necessarily true. Both the specific kind of use
and its design are important to the maintenance of healthy,
attractive, and convenient neighborhood units. In many older
(and some newer) areas blight has been introduced by the
wrong kind of commercial use or by a poorly designed use which
damages the amenities of the area.
217 Moore v. City of Lexington, 309 Xy. 671, 218 S.W.2d 7 (1948).
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What this adds up to is this. Under Euclidean zoning no
body legally has power to make individual discriminations in the
context of a given locale based upon rational planning consider-
ations, and to permit development accordingly. 18 The board of
adjustment, under pressure from applicant after applicant, has
assumed this power. But the variance procedure really falls far
short of giving intelligent flexibility within a framework de-
signed to accord equal protection of the law. Planning consider-
ations do not receive careful evaluation there. The board does
not have the expertise to know what is trivial and can be dis-
posed of quickly and what is substantial and requires close ex-
amination. For lack of time it cannot sit down with the appli-
cant and, by patience, suggestions, and persuasion, bring him
around to making changes which will make the use compatible
with the area. Furthermore, because of the "strict and severe
limitations" courts have imposed on the board's powers, the
board is not always prepared to be honest and articulate about
its reasons for reaching a particular result. It cannot promulgate
the kind of standards we need for administrative decisions, for,
queerly enough, they would be illegal. An ideal breeding ground
for adventitious factors results. The debilitating effect of oper-
ating without known policy guides has been, we think, amply
demonstrated in this study.
While the board has moved from adjudication to a vital,
strategic position in the administration of the zoning ordinance,
this has not been accompanied by a rationalization of tech-
niques. We now have flexibility, it is true, but without any real
check on responsibility, or any benefits of expertise, or any articu-
lation of the true rules of the game.
The primary task of lawyers in the land planning area is to
devise institutions through which community values can be con-
tinuously clarified, intelligent means for their implementation
selected, and democratic controls, which assure equal protection
of the law, maintained. The planning commission-board of ad-
218 We are speaking here about developed areas. With respect to undeveloped
areas, the planning commission has considerable flexibility. The standard prac-
tice is to zone undeveloped areas for agricultural use; thus the would-be de-
veloper must ask the commission for a zone change, which is granted or denied
on the basis of general guidelines in the master plan. Flexible control over the
design of the development, and over the quantity of land devoted to particular
uses, can also be wielded through subdivision regulations.
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justment system, with attendant legal doctrines, was developed
before the great rise of, and experimentation with, federal ad-
ministrative agencies. It was devised in an era when the dis-
tinction between "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judiciaY' func-
tions was more meaningful than it is today. It was based on
assumptions about social behavior and societal needs that have
proven inadequate. Our task today is to determine what alter-
ations in present institutions, practices, and legal norms are
necessary to produce a more rational system of land use controls.
There have been several suggestions for reforming the zoning
board of adjustment.219 They include:
(a) tightening up the procedures ("judicialization") of the
board;
(b) abolition and replacement by a board of experts;
(c) abolition and replacement by a single local administra-
tor with a right to appeal to
(i) the local legislative body, or
(ii) a state-wide board of appeal, or
(iii) a committee of the planning commission.
Some of these remedies have merit. But none of them goes to
the basic problem: a Euclidean zoning system which, at the age
of fifty, is showing definite signs of old age. We are not sure
that hardening of the arteries can be cured by small, or even
massive, doses of Geritol.
219 See Leary, A Model Procedure for the Administration of Zoning Regula-
tions 72-92 (1958); Babcock, The Unhappy State of Zoning Administration in
Illinois, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 509 (1959); Reps, Discretionar Powers of the Board
of Zoning Appeals, 20 Law & Contemp. Prob. 280 (1955); Dallstream & Hunt,
Variations, Exceptions and Special Uses, 1954 U. Mll. L.F. 218; Note, 74 Harv. L.
Rev. 1396 (1961).
